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INTRODUCTION 
Patent owners have managed to offend almost everyone.  Patented 
pharmaceuticals come at breathtakingly high prices,1 while their owners 
pay others not to produce cheaper generics.2  Dense patent thickets 
hamper competitive entry and waste existing participants’ energies and 
resources on defensive portfolios and intramural litigation.3  Patents on 
the stuff of life constrain agricultural activity4 and medical innovation,5 
making it harder to eat well and obtain treatment for what ails us.6  
Patent owners attach conditions to goods we buy, limiting our ability to 
use and sell them to others.7  Non-producing patent-holding companies 
 
1. The United States Government Accountability Office report provides a good 
description of the concerns.  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-201, BRAND-
NAME PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICING: LACK OF THERAPEUTICALLY EQUIVALENT DRUGS 
AND LIMITED COMPETITION MAY CONTRIBUTE TO EXTRAORDINARY PRICE INCREASES 
(2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10201.pdf (last visited August 2, 2010). 
2. The issue has garnered judicial, administrative and legislative attention.  See, e.g., 
Ark. Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund, Paper, A.F. of L. v. Bayer AG (In re 
Ciprofloxacin), 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010), rehearing en banc denied, 2010 WL 3464382 (C.A. 
2); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. 
denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009); Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 
2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006); Tony Dutra, “Senate Judiciary Committee Likely to 
Modify Bill Banning Reverse Payment Agreements,” Pat. Trademark & Copyright Law 
Daily (BNA) (Sept. 11, 2009), reprinted in 9/11/2009 PTD d10 (Westlaw); “House 
Subcommittee Approves Bill to Ban Reverse Payments to Generic Drug Firms,”  Pat. 
Trademark & Copyright Law Daily (BNA) (June 4, 2009), reprinted in 6/4/2009 PTD d4 
(Westlaw); Jacqueline Bell, FTC Pushes Congress to Pass Drug Settlement Bill, LAW 360 
(June 3, 2009), http://www.law360.com/print_article/104204. 
3. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (discussing the thicket 
concern); Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent 
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 303–08, 321 (2006–07); Carl 
Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, 1 
INNOVATION POL’Y AND THE ECON. 119 (2000). 
4. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 488 F.3d 973 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 
S. Ct. 871 (2008); Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 
U.S. 1342 (2007). 
5. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 421 F.3d at 1378; Robin C. Feldman, The Insufficiency of 
Antitrust Analysis for Patent Misuse, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 399, 439–49 (2003–04) (discussing the 
effects of Reach-Through Royalties). 
6. Id.  See also Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 669 F. Supp. 2d 365 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (an on-going lawsuit in the Southern District of New York involving patents 
on breast and ovarian cancer genetic diagnostics which gate access to related testing); Lab. 
Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Lab., Inc., 548 U.S. 124 (2006) (writ of certiorari 
dismissed as improvidently granted); Prometheus Lab., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Serv., 581 
F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009), cert. granted, remanded, 130 S.Ct. 3543 (2010). 
7. See, e.g., Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(addressing the validity of such restrictions); Daniel L. Reisner, Patent Licensing and Misuse 
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ambush industry standards that improve quality and ease of use8 and 
demand tolls from anyone doing anything successfully.9 
There ought to be a law.  There is.  It is called patent misuse.10  When 
a patent owner overreaches, the courts refuse to enforce the patent until 
the related harm has been undone.  That sounds eminently reasonable.  
When patent owners interfere with society, society takes their patents 
 
Issues, in DEVELOPMENTS IN PHARMACEUTICAL AND BIOTECH PATENT LAW 2008 (PLI 
Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No. 17180, 2008),  
944 PLI/Pat 87 (Westlaw) and Patricia A. Martone & Richard M. Feustel, Jr., The Patent 
Misuse Defense–Does it Still Have Vitality?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 2005 
(PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No. 6250, 
2005), 832 PLI/Pat 145 (Westlaw) (both discussing the myriad forms of licensing restrictions, 
their practical effects and legal validity); Katherine E. White, A Rule for Determining When 
Patent Misuse Should Be Applied, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 671 
(2001) (analyzing the effects of such restraints).  The extensive use of conditional 
conveyances has given rise to renewed interest in the doctrine of patent exhaustion.  See, e.g., 
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008); Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale 
Restraints and Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine in Perspective (Univ. of Iowa Legal 
Stud. Res., Paper No. 10-08, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1540527; Thomas 
G. Hungar, Observations Regarding the Supreme Court’s Decision in Quanta Computer, Inc. 
v. LG Elec., Inc., 49 IDEA 517 (2008–09).  As patent exhaustion constrains imposing post-sale 
restrictions on patented products, it overlaps with misuse.  See infra note 54 (discussing the 
overlap in the Court’s analysis in its seminal misuse case). 
8. See, e.g., Rambus Inc. v. F.T.C., 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 
1318 (2009), and Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 548 F.3d 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (both 
dismissing standards ambush allegations).  See also Vincent Chiappetta, Patenting Industry 
Standards, in PATENT LAW AND THEORY ch. 26 (Toshiko Takenaka ed., 2008) [hereinafter 
Chiappetta, Standards]; Apostolos Chronopoulos, Patenting Standards—A Case for US 
Antitrust Law or a Call for Recognizing Immanent Public Policy Limitations to the 
Exploitation Rights Conferred by the Patent Act?, 40 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. AND 
COMPETITION LAW 782 (2009); Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of 
Industry Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623 (2002). 
9. The literature is legion, but the Supreme Court decision in eBay, Inc. v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006), provides useful judicial insight into the concern, 
particularly Justice Kennedy’s concurrence.  Current congressional efforts regarding patent 
reform also focus on the issue.  See Tony Dutra, “Patent Trolls Focus of House Judiciary 
Committee Hearing on Patent Reform Bill,” Pat., Trademark & Copyright Law Daily (BNA) 
(May 1, 2009), reprinted in 5/1/2009 PTD d1 (Westlaw). 
10. The history and details of the regime are discussed in detail infra at Part I.B.  The 
misuse doctrine has also been applied in other intellectual property regimes, in particular 
copyright law.  Although the economic efficiency arguments made with regard to patent 
misuse apply equally to other regimes, distinct policy considerations and the resulting 
adjustments to the right to exclude (for example the fair use and idea-expression dichotomy 
free speech considerations in copyright law) make direct application inappropriate.  Those 
differences make the intriguing effort to produce a unified approach to misuse extremely 
problematic.  See Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure (Univ. of Iowa Legal Stud. 
Res., Paper No. 09-41, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1474407; Thomas F. Cotter, 
Misuse, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 901 (2007–08); Gary Myers, Toward a Unified Theory of 
Intellectual Property Misuse (Univ. of Miss. Sch. of Law, Working Paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1507173.  The arguments and conclusions in this discussion are 
explicitly limited to patent misuse. 
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away. 
But not everyone feeling patent pain can legitimately claim misuse.  
Patent law expressly intends and depends upon patent owners 
interfering with others’ desires.11  Misuse only occurs when the pain 
exceeds the inherent costs of the system—the harm society has decided 
individuals must bear to obtain the regime’s benefits. 
Distinguishing between inherent and excessive/misuse costs has 
proven problematic.12  We do not even agree that the misuse doctrine 
should exist, much less when it should apply.  Some argue misuse stands 
as a vital guardian of patent policy, particularly the regime’s mission of 
promoting innovation.13  Others argue that, at best, the doctrine 
uselessly duplicates the role of other laws (notably antitrust); while at 
worst it affirmatively interferes with efficient market operation.14 
Unsurprisingly, confusion also reigns at the coalface of application.  
The Supreme Court created the doctrine almost a century ago15 when 
society was feeling the powerful effects of unchecked monopoly, patent 
and otherwise, and determining how best to respond.  Despite the 
considerable refinement of the patent and antitrust regimes, the Court 
 
11. The patent system is discussed infra at Part I.A. 
12. For examples of the myriad changes in the doctrine see, e.g., Richard Calkins, 
Patent Law: The Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act and Noerr-Pennington 
Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 DRAKE L. REV. 175, 178–92 
(1988–89); Daniel P. Homiller, Patent Misuse in Patent Pool Licensing: From National 
Harrow to “The Nine No-Nos” to Not Likely, 7 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 3–18 (2006); 
Robert J. Hoerner, The Decline (and Fall?) of the Patent Misuse Doctrine in the Federal 
Circuit, 69 ANTITRUST L. J. 669 (2001–02). 
13. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 5, at 401; Joe Potenza et al., Patent Misuse—The 
Crucial Balance, A Patent Lawyer’s View, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 69, 71 (2005–06). 
14. See, e.g., USM Corp. v. SPS Tech., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511–12 (7th Cir. 1982); Mark 
A. Lemley, Comment, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. 
REV. 1599, 1600 (1990) (arguing misuse and antitrust should be coextensive); David 
McGowan, What Tool Works Tells Us about Tailoring Patent Misuse Remedies, 102 NW. U. L. 
REV. 421, 428 (2008) (also focusing on the doctrine’s remedial disconnection from related 
harm).  Professor Lemley appears to have recanted the more general position (without 
specific explanation of where the error lies), but stands by the argument that the misuse 
remedy is improperly calibrated to resulting harms.  See Mark A. Lemley, Beyond 
Preemption: the Law and Policy of Intellectual Property Licensing, 87 CAL. L. REV. 111, 152 
n. 188 (1999).  See also Thomas F. Cotter, Four Questionable Rationales for the Patent Misuse 
Doctrine (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series, Paper No. 10-30, 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1616275 (offering a useful review of four possible misuse 
justifications, which he ultimately rejects while stopping short of calling for unqualified 
abolition of the doctrine). 
15. The first inklings of misuse are found in the Supreme Court’s 1917 decision in 
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).  Challenges to 
patent use, of course, arose earlier, but where initially resolved in favor of the patent owner.  
See Calkins, supra note 12, at 178 and infra Part I.B (discussing the origins and development 
of the misuse doctrine). 
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has not revisited the substantive law of patent misuse for almost forty 
years.16  Congress, the legislative custodian of the patent system, has 
only kibitzed, indicating that market power is important, but (perhaps) 
only sometimes.17  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the 
“Federal Circuit”) finds itself in the inopportune middle, seeking to 
reconcile the Supreme Court’s past with its present.  The resulting 
misuse chimera first attempts to apply the vague misuse “exceeding the 
scope of the patent” test to identify problematic provisions, then makes 
the determination by awkwardly relying on modern antitrust 
anticompetitive effects assessment except when Court precedent 
explicitly requires otherwise.18 
The time has come to dispense with patent misuse entirely.  In the 
prevailing market efficiency paradigm, the doctrine’s limitations on 
exploitation of patent rights are not only superfluous, but affirmatively 
harmful.  Misuse’s purely defensive posture, incoherent and inaccurate 
“scope of the patent” inquiry, and poorly-calibrated, one-size-fits-all 
blanket unenforceability remedy have been rendered obsolete by 
subsequent, more nuanced legal responses to potential patent power.  
Antitrust law draws more appropriate balances between maximizing 
patent incentives while minimizing undue interference with market 
operation and innovation.  Inequitable conduct, abuse of process, 
antitrust sham litigation, and Walker Process liability more effectively 
control abuses of the patent prosecution process and improper 
assertions of patent rights.  Granted, these regimes remain imperfectly 
implemented, but their approach and experience provide a far more 
 
16. The last substantive misuse case was Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 
Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969) (providing flexibility in the doctrine’s application, as discussed infra 
notes 166–72 and accompanying text).  The Court did reference misuse in Blonder-Tongue 
Lab. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971), but not for substantive application.  Rather, 
the Court discussed the doctrine’s public policy-based “invention” limitation on the reach of 
the patent “monopoly” as a justification for applying res judicata/collateral estoppel when a 
patent has been invalidated.  Since Blonder-Tongue, the Court has twice discussed misuse, 
but in both cases only to note the evolution away from the doctrine’s assumption that a 
patent creates market power and related market harms and toward an antitrust net effects 
assessment.  See Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Dawson Chem. 
Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 221–23 (1980). 
17. See infra notes 91–103 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional actions 
regarding misuse). 
18. The Federal Circuit’s most recent attempt was the en banc decision in Princo Corp. 
v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  The case reaffirmed the applicability 
of the “scope of the patent” and “anticompetitive effects” tests (the six judge majority, joined 
on the issue by the two concurring justices and the two dissenters) but featured a 
disagreement over how they related to one another and should be applied.  See infra notes 
84–89 and accompanying text (discussing in more detail the Federal Circuit’s attempt to 
reconcile per se misuse precedent with antitrust anticompetitive effects inquiry). 
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effective foundation for making the necessary adjustments.  Continued 
availability of the misuse defense wastes time and resources on a 
pointless struggle to update an antiquated doctrine that unnecessarily 
decreases access and, contrary to its defender’s claims, interferes with 
rather than advances patent policy. 
The Federal Circuit’s current “mixed” approach does much to 
mitigate the problem.  But as a circuit court, it remains constrained by 
Supreme Court precedent.19  That latter Court should take the earliest 
opportunity to eliminate its now outdated doctrine.20  Failing prompt 
judicial action, Congress should use the current reform effort as a 
vehicle for legislative abolition. 
Beyond clarifying that misuse has outlived its purpose, the inquiry 
into the doctrine’s justifications provides useful insights regarding how 
to ease the difficult problem of living with patents.  An appropriate 
relationship must be predicated on two facts: first, patents unavoidably 
cause pain and unhappiness and second, people feeling the adverse 
effects inevitably will complain.  The misuse inquiry reveals that 
legitimate complaints only arise from two sources: (1) improper 
implementation producing harms unnecessary to achieve an agreed 
upon goal, or (2) unhappiness with the goal (currently, that frequently 
means with the consequences of the prevailing market efficiency 
paradigm). 
The misuse inquiry also clarifies the appropriate response.  
Punishing those who obtain and use patents in accordance with existing 
laws resolves neither problem.  Our many implementation debates 
require application of legal expertise to adjust patent law’s issuance 
requirements, rights and remedies, and antitrust and other general law 
requirements governing market exploitation.  But we must avoid 
conflating those primarily technical problems resolved by applying 
metrics reflecting the stated goal with complaints arising from the 
efficiency paradigm’s intrinsic inability to produce certain social 
outcomes.  For example, many seeking limitations on pharmaceutical 
patent holder reverse payments are unhappy with the existing patent 
system’s distributional consequences.  Similarly, those labeling patent 
owner interferences with industry standards “ambushes” and royalty 
seeking, non-practicing patent owners “trolls” are expressing “moral” 
disapproval of the intensely self-interested competitive behavior which, 
 
19. See infra notes 84–89 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal Circuits 
efforts to cabin the doctrine while remaining consistent with Supreme Court precedent). 
20. See infra notes 260–74 and accompanying text (discussing the justification for 
Supreme Court reversal of these long-standing precedents). 
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as Adam Smith explained, serves as the essential driver of an efficient 
market economy.21 
Coherent debate in these latter situations requires explicit 
identification and discussion of our underlying normative differences.  
Until we have determined what the patent/legal system should produce, 
there is little value in proposing and assessing specific implementation 
strategies.  That unproductively jumbles what is to be achieved with how 
an unresolved “it” can best be produced, guaranteeing the confusion 
and discord of talking past rather than to each other.  It is better to 
recognize our disagreements on the “right” and seek a mutually 
acceptable compromise.  In that difficult process, we should not only 
recognize that one person’s “justice” is another’s “misuse,” but that our 
differing beliefs have, and importantly, are frequently predicated on, 
their practical consequences.  In particular, distributional and 
behavioral outcomes can profoundly affect our social relationships, 
including others’ ultimate continued participation.  When considered 
from the perspective of preserving the fabric of society, making 
concessions on patent policy may prove a much simpler proposition. 
Part I below provides the general context for the misuse inquiry.  It 
first describes the prevailing efficiency-driven legal paradigm and its 
implementation in patent and generally applicable law (including 
antitrust).  It then discusses the history of and rationale for the misuse 
doctrine.  Part II explains why misuse cannot be justified within the 
existing legal paradigm and how its continued existence causes 
affirmative social harm.  Part III discusses appropriate next steps: the 
prompt legislative or judicial elimination of patent misuse and how we 
can use the misuse experience to more productively discuss our 
difficulties in living with patents. 
PART I: THE CONTEXT 
A. Patent Policy–The Economic Efficiency Paradigm, in Brief   
A doctrine designed to prevent the misuse of a patent system must 
start from understanding its proper operation.  Patents give their owners 
the legal right to prevent others from using the covered invention.22  
 
21. See ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (Everyman’s Library, 1991) (1776) (“It is 
not from the benevolence of the butcher, brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but 
from their regard to their own interest.  We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to 
their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.”). 
22. Under current United States patent law, that generally means the right to prevent 
others from making, using, offering to sell, selling or importing the patented invention.  See 35 
U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
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That exclusionary right restricts access and produces related individual 
and social costs.23  The decision to grant patents indicates that society 
has determined some goal justifies absorbing those costs.  By definition, 
a patent owner can only misuse a patent right if the use generates costs 
exceeding those required to produce the desired outcome. 
There are many possible justifications for creating patent rights.24  
The primary justification for current United States patent law can, 
however, be readily identified.25  The regime forms an integral part of a 
larger commercial law system designed to foster efficient operation of 
our primarily market-based economy.26  Because patent law does not 
exist in isolation, understanding its role and what constitute its inherent 
costs requires a brief look at the overall system. 
The efficient market model serves as the primary organizing 
principle for economic relationships in the United States.27  The invisible 
hand of self-interested competition, acting through individually 
 
23. The harms can be individual (inability to obtain desired or necessary resources) 
and/or societal (for example, harm to efficient market operation in the aggregate) as 
discussed infra in Part II.A. 
24. The diverse list of justifications can usefully be focused on three core concepts: 
Lockean labor theory, personal autonomy/personhood interests, and economic market 
efficiency/utility theory.  See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN 
THE NEW TECHNOLOGY AGE 2–19 (Aspen Revised 4th ed. 2007) (one of many casebooks 
ably introducing law students to the range of justifications for granting individual intellectual 
property rights to exclude).  The initial decision to create a patent regime must, of course, 
also address normative positions which reject granting individual rights, in particular 
communitarian visions of society.  See, e.g., Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing 
to Disagree: The WTO, TRIPS, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 
MICH. J. INT’L. L. 333, 375–81 [hereinafter Chiappetta, International]. 
25. Identification of the justification does not make it “right” in the normative sense.  
It merely means that, for better or worse, it is in fact what currently drives United States 
patent law. 
26. Of course, the entire United States legal system does not implement market 
efficiency goals.  Many laws impose requirements on our social interactions independently of 
efficiency considerations.  But the significant core of commercial law regulating our economic 
relationships, of which patent law forms an integral part, does, for the reasons discussed 
below in the text.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW ch. 2 (5th 
ed. 1998) (summarizing the use and limitations of economic theory as an analytical tool for 
explaining and assessing law) and generally (providing numerous examples of its application); 
infra notes 27–34 identifying various examples.  See also Vincent Chiappetta, Trademarks: 
More Than Meets the Eye, 2003 U. ILL. J. L. TECH. & POL. 35, 39–40 (discussing the triumph 
of market efficiency/utility theory over other justifications for United States intellectual 
property rights). 
27. The development of modern antitrust law provides a clear example of the primacy 
of market efficiency in the US commercial law system.  See PHILLIP AREEDA ET AL., 
ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 38–39 (6th ed. 2004) (“the vast majority of congressmen were sincere 
proponents of a private enterprise system,” that is the market economy); HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, ch. 1–2 (3d ed. 2005); POSNER, supra note 26, 
ch. 10.  See also Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978). 
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negotiated and agreed exchanges, drives the vast bulk of production and 
consumption decisions, as well as ultimate resource allocations.  The 
related bias against directive governmental intervention has produced a 
complex, integrated commercial law system primarily focused on 
process.28  In lieu of dictating outcomes, these laws reduce the 
disconnection between the theoretical assumptions essential to efficient 
market operation (in the economic theory meaning of “efficiency”) and 
the real world in which actual market exchanges take place.29  For 
example, fraud and the securities laws mandate disclosures to reduce 
asymmetrical information.30  Environmental and nuisance laws constrain 
negative externalities.31  Contract and business organization statutes 
provide templates reducing transaction costs.32 
The overall system objective of maximizing market efficiency has 
two important consequences regarding legal interventions.  First, it 
means that every legal intervention must be assessed with the overall 
framework.  Although specific laws will target improvements in a 
particular theoretical assumption, it must do so by producing a “net” 
efficiency improvement, taking into account the adverse effects of its 
requirements.  For example, a proposed residential seller disclosure law 
might mandate disclosure of latent defects to reduce information 
asymmetries.33  Those efficiency enhancing improvements are not, 
however, sufficient to justify the legal intervention standing alone.  If 
the related compliance costs exceed the benefits of the additional 
information (particularly in light of alternatives such as buyer 
inspections) then the requirement must either be adjusted to produce a 
net benefit or be abandoned. 
Antitrust law provides the most explicit doctrinal articulation of the 
net improvement requirement.  The regime exists primarily to maximize 
the “perfect competition” assumption vital to an efficiently operating 
market.34  Although interference with competition triggers antitrust 
 
28. Antitrust law also provides a good example of the process versus outcome 
orientation of most U.S. commercial laws.  See AREEDA, supra note 27, at 10. 
29. See, e.g., HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANALYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS ch. 
6 (5th ed.  2003) (discussing basic microeconomic theory and the market “failure” problems of 
monopoly, information, externalities and public goods).  See generally POSNER, supra note 26 
(discussing these problems in connection with various legal regimes). 
30. See, e.g., JACKSON ET AL., supra note 29, at 329–34; POSNER, supra note 26, at 122–
26, 486–90. 
31. See, e.g., JACKSON ET AL., supra note 29, at 351–61; POSNER, supra note 26, at 68–
72, 410–16. 
32. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 26, at 108. 
33. See, e.g., JACKSON ET AL., supra note 29, at 334; POSNER, supra note 26, at 68–72, 
410–16. 
34. See AREEDA, supra note 27, at 5–10, 37–40; HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, at ch. 1 
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concern, it does not, standing alone, constitute a violation under the 
regime’s primary assessment mechanism—the Rule of Reason.35  That 
rule permits even clear restraints when “reasonable,” that is, found 
essential to producing other greater efficiency improvements resulting 
in an overall net gain.36  For example, a price-fixing agreement among 
competitors significantly impairs competition.  Nonetheless, such 
agreements will pass Rule of Reason muster when it plays an essential 
role in producing the offsetting benefit of a collaborative new product 
offering.37 
Second, an efficient market system focuses exclusively on net 
aggregate outcomes.38  The distributional effects of a legal intervention 
producing a net overall improvement are irrelevant.  Concerns over who 
specifically receives what benefits or suffers what burdens involve 
distinct and frequently conflicting normative considerations requiring 
separate discussion and resolution. 
Patent law’s specific role in the efficiency system focuses on 
innovation.39  Innovation performs a vital market function—producing 
 
(indicating that other values may play a role, but the central objective is to “police the 
highways of commerce” to ensure “full and free competition”). 
35. Fed. Trade Comm’n & Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaboration 
Among Competitors (Apr. 2000), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf [hereinafter Collaboration Guidelines] 
(providing a helpful overview of the Rule of Reason approach).  Those agencies provide 
useful insight into Rule of Reason analysis as applied to intellectual property exploitation.  
See Dep’t of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm’n, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property (Apr. 6, 1995), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm (last visited March 12, 2010) 
[hereinafter Licensing Guidelines]. 
36. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (articulating the 
fundamental rule of reason proposition that as every agreement restrains trade to some 
extent, the antitrust inquiry is whether it promotes or suppresses competition based on its 
overall effects); Broad. Music v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979) (showing that 
the rule of reason inquiry requires determining whether the agreement is “one designed to 
‘increase economic efficiency and render markets more rather than less competitive’”); 
LAWERENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN 
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 229–43 (2d ed. 2006). 
37. See, e.g., Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 19–24 (creation of the new product—a portfolio 
use license—requires pricing agreement for the product among the individual copyright 
owners); Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 35. 
38. The market efficiency approach to economic organization reflects what John Rawls 
labels a “pure justice” system (one which defines generally applicable rules of the game 
rather than dictates outcomes) in contrast with a “perfect justice” system (one which 
produces specific outcomes).  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 74–75 (HARVARD 
UNIV. PRESS 1999) (1971).  This system structure generates some of our more profound 
disagreements (patent and otherwise), particularly visible in the vigorous debates over 
appropriate economic distributional outcomes and behavioral norms.  See infra Part III.B.2. 
39. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 24, at 127; Vincent Chiappetta, Defining the Proper 
Scope of Internet Patents: If We Don’t Know Where We Want to Go, We’re Unlikely to Get 
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the new products and processes that increase output and reduce price.  
Efficiency theory posits that optimal levels of innovation depend on 
prospective inventors’ abilities to internalize returns on their 
investments.40  Third party use of an inventor’s innovations (“free-
riding”) interferes with capturing those returns resulting in under-
investment in, and related under-production of, innovation. 
The Framers found this free-riding “market failure” of sufficient 
concern to address it in the Constitution.41  Among Congress’ 
enumerated powers in Article I, section 8 is the right to “secure” to 
inventors the exclusive rights to their inventions for limited times in 
order “to Promote the Progress of [the] useful Arts.”42  Congress used 
this power to pass the first federal patent statute in 1790.43 
The patent law solution is a classic efficiency-driven legal 
intervention.  Rather than dictating specific innovation investments or 
outcomes, it leaves those decisions to market dynamics.44  Individuals 
target innovations they believe merit investment based on projected 
market success.  The patent exclusionary right prohibits free-riding and 
permits the inventor/investor to capture associated returns.45  However, 
obtaining actual returns depends on the transactional demand for the 
resulting invention.  Success can generate monopoly profits.  Market 
failure extinguishes the pursuit, redirecting energy and resources to 
other activities. 
 
There, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 289, 306–07 (2000–01) [hereinafter Chiappetta, 
Internet] (elaborating on the argument which follows in the text). 
40. See supra note 21 (discussing Adam Smith’s vision of what motivates individual 
action).  If this is not true, then we might reconsider whether we want a patent law at all. 
41. See Graham v. John Deer Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7–11 (describing the discussion between 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison regarding the former’s monopoly concerns, with 
Madison’s limited incentive position eventually prevailing). 
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
43. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 6–7; MERGES ET AL., supra note 24, at 121–24 (describing 
the evolution to present day).  The Patent Act is currently codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 
(2006). 
44. Patent law requires the inventive effort involve the “useful Arts,” a term whose 
breadth remains unclear.  See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).  Beyond that, the 
current regime imposes virtually no constraints regarding the field of invention, leaving the 
decisions of where to invest, when to invest, and how much to invest to individual decision.  
See, e.g., Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (unless 
Congress specifically limits the field of invention, which it has declined to do in all but one 
limited situation involving nuclear weapons; the courts do not make further “utility” 
determinations concerning the desirability of particular innovations). 
45. As the Court and commentators point out, although the returns flow to the patent-
owner, patent law does not exist to reward the inventor.  The patent “reward” serves merely 
as the means for achieving the system goal of preventing free-riding distortion of aggregate 
investment decisions.  See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 
502, 511 (1917); supra note 41. 
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As with other laws implementing the system’s efficiency objective, 
patent law does not “progress the useful arts” at all costs.46  The regime 
must do more than maximize overall investment in innovation.  It must 
produce a net improvement in efficient market operation, taking into 
account the decreased access resulting from the exclusionary right, such 
as interference with competitive use, deadweight loss, and impaired 
follow-on innovation.47 
The net improvement requirement can be readily identified in the 
regime’s requirements governing issuance and rights.  The novelty, non-
obviousness and operational (utility) requirements ensure that actual 
innovation benefits exist before society incurs any patent exclusionary 
costs.48  The Constitutional “limited times” constraint49 mitigates costs by 
capping access restrictions and supra-competitive returns to the patent 
term set by Congress.  Inventor enablement and publication obligations 
provide public notice and knowledge, reducing duplicative investment 
and inadvertent use as well as facilitating improvements and post-term 
implementation by others. 
Whether these requirements in fact generate a net improvement in 
efficiency remains the subject of vigorous debate.50  There is no 
question, however, that this goal (at least for now) remains the regime’s 
primary objective, meaning that patent law’s exclusionary rights should 
only be granted when they generate optimal increases in innovation in 
light of the related harms to efficient market operation. 
Understanding the overarching efficiency goal provides three 
important guidelines for the misuse inquiry.  First, when internal patent 
 
46.  The compromise between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison balanced the 
former’s monopoly harms concerns against incentives for innovation as epitomized in 
Jefferson’s summing up that allowing patents requires “drawing a line between the things 
which are worth to the public the embarrassment of a patent, and those which are not” (see 
Graham, 383 U.S. at 10–11 (describing the debate and quoting Jefferson)). 
47. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, § 1.3 (discussing the adverse economic 
effects of monopoly). 
48. See Vincent Chiappetta, Patentability of Computer Software Instruction as an 
“Article of Manufacture: Software as Such as the Right Stuff,” 17 J. MARSHALL. J. COMPUTER 
& INFO. L. 89, 99–106 (1998) [hereinafter Chiappetta, Software]. 
49. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; supra note 41. 
50. That discussion ranges across the full range of patent law cost concerns, including 
whether the covered subject matter is overly inclusive, see Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 
(2010) (reinforcing the proposition that not all innovation is patentable but leaving open the 
question of how that determination should be made), the legal sufficiency of the “invention” 
requirements (evolving standard of obviousness after KSR Int’l. Co. v. Telefex, Inc., 550 U.S. 
398 (2007)), the capacity of the United States Patent Office to perform adequate evaluations, 
the efficacy of post-issuance challenge processes and the scope of the exclusionary right, 
including the appropriate remedies.  See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing how these issues might 
be approached). 
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rules governing issuance, rights, and remedies produce net inefficiencies 
on their own terms, those harms do not constitute patent misuse.  If 
patent law inevitably produces unwarranted harms, punishing owners of 
validly acquired patents for exercising the related rights entirely misses 
the point and certainly cannot solve the problem.  Improper doctrinal 
implementation (for example, inadequately stringent standards for 
novelty/obviousness or an excessive term for the exclusionary right) 
requires a direct doctrinal response–recalibration of the faulty 
requirements.51 
Second, merely because a patent causes individual unhappiness does 
not make it “misuse.”  A legitimate complaint only arises when harm 
inessential to accomplishing the system goal occurs.  Current patent law 
may well focus too intently on producing maximal efficiency market 
outcomes and insufficiently on distributional consequences.  But as with 
improper calibration, using misuse as the corrective device illogically 
sanctions patent owners for doing what the present regime not only 
permits but is affirmatively designed to encourage.  The desire to 
temper or redirect patent law’s objectives should be raised 
transparently, not through a cloud of vague misuse complaints. 
Finally, treating patent and antitrust law as components of an overall 
system substantially clarifies the complicated relationship between 
them.52  Although antitrust law seeks to maximize competition, while 
patent law affirmatively impairs it, neither pursues its role single-
mindedly and autonomously.  Rather they (together with other regimes) 
operate cooperatively in pursuit of the same larger goal—better aligning 
 
51. The distinction drawn in the text explains why the “exceeds the scope of the 
patent” misuse inquiry proves so unworkable in practice.  The only inherent costs within the 
“scope of the patent” are those resulting from the exercise of the right to exclude – the refusal 
to grant access to the invention.  Although that refusal can impose excess costs, they arise 
from faulty implementation calling for statutory adjustment, not “misuse” by the patent 
owner.  In contrast any grant of access goes beyond the patent right to exclude and raises the 
possibility of excessive “misuse” costs arising from the terms of grant.   Ironically, the Court 
clearly recognized the distinction between inherent “patent rights” costs and additional 
“private access rights” costs, but then unhelpfully framed the inquiry as based on conditions 
which exceed the scope of the patent.  That test implies some access conditions constitute an 
inherent cost of a patent grant and are, therefore, exempt from review.  Compare infra notes 
110–121 (the Court’s identification of misuse as arising from privately created rights) with 
notes 54–72 (creation of the “scope of the patent” assessment). 
52. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. 
REV. 761 (2002); Robin Feldman, Patent and Antitrust Differing Shades of Meaning, 13 VA. 
J.L. & TECH. 3 (2008); Herbert Hovenkamp, Innovation and the Domain of Competition 
Policy, 2 MEADOR LECTURES (U. OF ALA.) 49 (2007–08); Mark A. Lemley, A New Balance 
Between IP and Antitrust, 13 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 237 (2007); Robert Pitofsky, Challenges 
of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTI. 
L. J. 913, 917 (2001). 
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an imperfect real world with the assumptions required for maximally 
efficient overall market operation.  When they interact, the issue is not 
determining which regime should prevail.  It is ensuring their joint 
application produces a maximally efficient market. 
Together these understandings cabin the appropriate justifications 
for misuse.  Internal implementation errors and unhappiness with patent 
law’s existing goals raise problems antecedent to misuse.  They are 
better addressed directly, not by punishing those doing what the law 
allows.  Valid misuse concerns only arise when a patent owner’s 
activities impose costs beyond those necessary to accomplish the 
regime’s established objective.  But even in such cases, merely causing 
harm does not justify legal prohibition.  The “system” question must 
also be answered—are the “excess” costs essential to producing a net 
overall efficiency gain?  If so, then no misuse has occurred. 
B. The Origins and Evolution of the Patent Misuse Doctrine   
A perfectly calibrated patent system producing an optimum net 
improvement in innovation does not eliminate costs.  It affirmatively 
imposes them.  The regime explicitly intends patent owners will use 
their exclusionary right to maximize individual returns, thus realizing on 
the incentives driving them to invest and produce the increase in 
innovation.  The result is unavoidable interference with others’ use. 
The more successful the patent, the greater the resulting pain, as 
owners will increase price and constrain output to ensure the greatest 
personal surplus possible.  Consumers who can afford access will 
transfer significant wealth to the patent owner, while the others will be 
left to pursue such second-best alternatives as may exist.  These 
limitations will constrain follow-on research and related development of 
new products and applications.  That in turn will increase the price and 
reduce availability of those resulting products and services, adversely 
affecting those desiring to acquire or improve them. 
Self-interested patent exploitation also produces a wide variety of 
non-price interferences.53  For example, licensees may only be granted 
the right to make a particular product or sell in a specific geographic or 
consumer market.  Or, they may be required to purchase other goods 
and services from the patent owner, not to deal with third party 
competitors, or to grant-back rights to improvements they develop.  
End-users may be similarly constrained by, for example, a single use, 
no-refill restriction on products incorporating the invention.  At the 
extreme, patent owners may suppress the invention entirely—
 
53. See supra note 7. 
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prohibiting all use and requiring that society forego the benefits of the 
invention during the entire patent term. 
These restrictions made licensees and end-consumers unhappy and 
others (particularly competitors) suspicious that patent holders were 
unfairly maximizing individual return at theirs and the public’s expense.  
In response to such complaints, aired by way of legal action, the 
Supreme Court created patent misuse. 
The doctrine’s origins trace back to the Court’s 1917 decision in 
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co.54  The 
case involved two patents owned by a patent holding company.  The 
first patent covered a uniquely functional film feeder for movie 
projectors.  The second patent involved certain less-desirable film-
making techniques.  Under an agreement the Court somewhat quaintly 
referred to as “a paper styled ‘License Agreement,’” the holding 
company limited use of all projectors incorporating its patented film 
feeder to showing movies made by authorized licensees of its film 
making techniques.  The defendant used a projector incorporating the 
patented feeder to show a film not meeting the License Agreement 
limitation.  The holding company sued the projector owner for 
infringing the film feeder patent based on non-licensed use. 
The Court found against the plaintiff patent owner.  Doing so 
required it to reverse nearly twenty years of prior decisions upholding 
similar patent owner licensing requirements mandating licensee use of 
“supplies . . . which are no part of the [patented machine].”55  The 
Court’s analysis focused on such limitations’ inconsistency with patent 
policy.  Finding that patent law’s primary purpose was to benefit the 
public by encouraging innovation and not “the creation of private 
 
54. 243 U.S. 502 (1917).  Professor Hovenkamp makes the good point that the Court’s 
reasoning in Motion Picture invokes the related doctrine of patent exhaustion.  See 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 7; Motion Picture, 243 U.S. at 515–16.  And certainly the Court only 
later expressly identifies and creates the distinct misuse defense and unenforceability sanction 
in Morton Salt.  See infra notes 67–75.  However, as both doctrines seek to prevent 
inappropriate patent use, they bear a close relationship to each other.  Consequently, the 
inquiry into misuse justifications benefits substantially from examining the foundational 
reasoning for restricting patent licenses in Motion Picture.  In its recent Princo decision, the 
Federal Circuit majority indicates that misuse may complement exhaustion—the latter 
applying to unconditional sales of patented goods, the former governing terms imposed in 
“conditional sales or licenses.”  Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 
(Fed. Cir. 2010).  That statement will likely trigger another round of debate over the proper 
reach of the exhaustion doctrine, in particular whether it prohibits post-sale conditions in all 
circumstances.  See supra note 7.  That in turn will require sorting out any related effects on 
misuse.  Better to eliminate misuse and avoid the confusion, leaving exhaustion to stand or 
fall independently. 
55. See Motion Picture, 243 U.S. at 514–18 (discussing the prior law permitting such 
requirements).  See also Calkins, supra note 12, at 179–80. 
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fortunes for the owners of patents,”56 the Court reasoned that although 
“inventors should be fairly, even liberally, treated”57 protecting the 
public against unjustified costs required that an inventor’s rights “must 
be limited to the invention described in the claims of his patent.”58  
Delivering on that policy limitation made it “not competent for the 
owner of [a] patent . . . to, in effect, extend the scope of its patent 
monopoly by restricting the use of it to materials necessary in its 
operation . . . .”59  Specifically, as “[t]he patent law furnishes no warrant 
for such a practice . . . the cost, inconvenience and annoyance to the 
public . . . forbid it.”60 
Applied to the facts, the Court found the film feeder patent claims 
did not extend to the mandated film making techniques, thus putting 
them outside the plaintiff’s legal right to exclude.  As a result, enforcing 
the License Agreement limitation on the use of the film feeder would be 
“wholly without the scope and purpose of our patent laws” and “gravely 
injurious to . . . public interest.”61  The Court concluded that the 
restriction must, therefore, be declared “plainly void.”62  Finally, the 
Court affirmed the lower court’s holding that without the limitation, no 
infringement occurred, apparently agreeing that the challenged use of 
the projector fell within the “implied right to use the machine as it had 
been used.”63 
The Court concluded by noting that the newly minted Clayton Act 
antitrust statute prohibition on “tying” (in this case requiring use of the 
film-making technique to obtain the highly desirable film feeder) was “a 
most persuasive [supporting] expression of the public policy of our 
country with respect to the question before us.”64  However, having 
already reached the unenforceability conclusion on independent patent 
policy grounds, the Court declined to determine whether the License 
Agreement restriction also violated antitrust laws.65 
After Motion Picture, the Court continued to apply the patent 
 
56. See Motion Picture, 243 U.S. at 511.  This finding reflects the prevailing economic 
efficiency justification for patent law, focusing on the benefit to society as a whole, rather 
than on rewarding the efforts of the individual inventor.  See supra notes 38–50 and 
accompanying text. 
57. See Motion Picture, 243 U.S. at 511. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 516. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 519. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 508. 
64. Id. at 517–18. 
65. Id. at 517. 
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policy-based rationale to render limitations imposed by patent owners 
unenforceable.66  However, it was not until its Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. 
Suppiger Co.67 decision twenty-five years later that the Court expressly 
labeled the defense “misuse” and created the present blanket 
unenforceability-of-the-patent remedy.  The Morton Salt Company held 
patents on machines used to deposit salt tablets during the canning 
process.  All licenses covering the patented machines limited their use to 
salt tablets purchased from a Morton Salt subsidiary.  When a third 
party began selling the patented machines, Morton Salt sued for 
infringement.  The defendant argued that the machine patents should be 
held unenforceable because the related licenses tied use of the machines 
to purchase of salt in violation of the Clayton Act.  The court of appeals 
found for Morton Salt, holding that the Clayton Act requirement that 
the challenged act must “substantially lessen competition” had not been 
satisfied.68 
The Supreme Court reversed; however, instead of addressing the 
lower court’s antitrust holding, the Court invoked patent misuse.  The 
reasoning started from the proposition that the patent holder was using 
“its patent monopoly to restrain competition in the marketing of 
unpatented articles” (in this case the salt).69  The Court then applied the 
Motion Picture patent policy rationale, finding the “public policy 
adopted by the Constitution and the laws of the United States ‘to 
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts . . .’” precludes uses 
of a patent which extends the owner’s rights beyond the scope of the 
covered invention.70  As Morton Salt’s tie produced “an exclusive right 
or limited monopoly not granted by the Patent Office” (that is, on the 
salt which was not included within the machine claims), the related 
license limitation was “contrary to the public interest.”71  The Court 
concluded that Morton Salt’s abuse of its patent rights triggered the 
doctrine of unclean hands, and the related equitable considerations 
dictated that the courts should refuse to enforce not just the specific 
restriction, but the patent.72 
Withholding patent enforcement on equity and public policy 
grounds had two important remedial consequences.  First, the Court 
found that the adverse effect on the public interest “disqualifies the 
 
66. See Calkins, supra note 12, at 181.  
67. 314 U.S. 488 (1942). 
68. Id. at 490. 
69. Id. at 491. 
70. Id. at 492. 
71. Id. 
72. Id.  
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[patentee] to maintain . . . suit regardless of whether the particular 
defendant has suffered from the misuse of the patent.”73  That made 
misuse a complete defense to infringement by any party, even those 
unaffected by the specific action constituting misuse.  It therefore 
applied not just to potential contributory infringers (those selling salt for 
use with the machines in violation of the license) but even direct 
infringers, such as the defendants, who made and sold the patented 
invention.  Second, in order to repair the damage to the public interest, 
the Court found the bar to enforcement must continue “at least until it 
is made to appear that the improper practice as been abandoned and the 
consequences of the misuse of the patent have been dissipated.”74 
Beyond establishing the “misuse” defense, the Morton Salt decision 
also reaffirmed the Motion Picture position that the doctrine’s 
application does not depend on an antitrust violation, expressly finding 
it “unnecessary to decide whether respondent violated the Clayton 
Act.”75  In short, misuse exists to prevent interference with the proper 
implementation of patent public policy, a role independent of (although 
perhaps over-lapping with) antitrust law’s objectives. 
The separation of misuse doctrine enforcement and remedies from 
antitrust law produced a number of important differences.  
Procedurally, misuse is an exclusively defensive regime.  Neither those 
whose actions have not been challenged by the patent owner nor the 
government have standing to affirmatively attack possible patent owner 
over-reaching.  Substantively, to prevail a defendant need only show the 
action exceeds the scope of the patent right, not harm to the market 
itself.76  Remedially, misuse only renders the specific action and the 
related patent unenforceable.  No damages can be claimed for actual 
harms to either the individuals or the marketplace, nor can other 
affirmative corrective actions be required. 
In contrast, antitrust law permits (and contemplates) affirmative 
claims by private plaintiffs suffering cognizable antitrust harm,77 whether 
or not they have been challenged by the patent owner, as well as by 
governmental authorities whenever they believe it necessary to prevent 
 
73. Id. at 494. 
74. Id. at 493. 
75. Id. at 494. 
76. Applying the foundational “beyond the physical or temporal scope of the patent” 
misuse test creates substantial difficulties in practice.  See infra notes 118–21 and 
accompanying text; supra note 51. 
77. See AREEDA, supra note 27, at 60–69 (discussing standing and antitrust injury); 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ch. 16. 
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harm to the market.78  Antitrust plaintiffs must, however, show that the 
challenged action has a net anti-competitive effect on the overall 
market, not merely that it exceeds the scope of the patent or causes 
individual harm.  Finally, the regime offers a much wider range of 
remedial options allowing courts to match relief to specific harm.  
Injunctive relief prohibiting and requiring actions as necessary to 
prevent and repair interference with the market79 can be granted along 
with damages in compensation for injury caused.80  A court must also 
award exemplary treble damages and reasonable attorneys’ fees as 
encouragement to private plaintiff enforcement and deterrence to 
would-be violators.81  Egregious per se violations also trigger the 
additional deterrence of criminal sanctions, in the form of substantial 
fines and jail time.82 
For the forty years following Morton Salt, the lower courts followed 
the Court’s lead in treating misuse as distinct from and farther reaching 
than antitrust law’s Rule of Reason net effects inquiry.83  Consequently, 
the 1986 Federal Circuit decision in Windsurfing International, Inc. v. 
AMF, Inc.84 surprised many by articulating misuse as “impermissibly 
broaden[ing] of the ‘physical or temporal scope’ of the patent grant with 
anticompetitive effect” (emphasis added).85  The addition of the 
anticompetitive effects requirement was clearly not inadvertent.  It was 
specifically reiterated when framing the misuse claimant’s burden as 
follows: “[t]o sustain a misuse defense in a licensing arrangement not 
held to have been per se anticompetitive by the Supreme Court, a 
factual determination must reveal the overall effect of the license tends 
to restrain competition unlawfully in an appropriately defined 
market.”86 
Despite commentator criticism of Windsurfing as inconsistent with 
 
78. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ch. 15.  Both the federal Department of Justice 
and the Federal Trade Commission have express statutory authority to enforce the Sherman 
and Clayton Acts.  Only the Federal Trade Commission can proceed under Federal Trade 
Commission Act, § 5.  State governmental authorities enforce state antitrust laws which are 
not preempted.  See AREEDA, supra note 27, at 90. 
79. See AREEDA, supra note 27, at 50–58. 
80. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ch. 17. 
81. See AREEDA, supra note 27, at 58; HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ch. 17.3. 
82. See AREEDA, supra note 27, at 45–46; HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ch. 15.1a. 
83. In Zenith Radio, the Court left even less doubt than in Motion Picture and Morton 
Salt regarding misuse’s independence from antitrust law, stating that “if there was . . . patent 
misuse, it does not necessarily follow that the misuse embodies the ingredients of an [antitrust 
violation].”  Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969). 
84. 782 F.2d 995 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986). 
85. Id. at 1001. 
86. Id. at 1002. 
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the Supreme Court’s articulation of the misuse doctrine,87 subsequent 
Federal Circuit misuse decisions have continued to apply its two-step 
analysis.88  It must first be ascertained whether or not the challenged 
action (generally a licensing requirement or limitation) broadens (seeks 
advantage beyond) the physical or temporal scope of the patent’s 
claims.  If not, the action is per se valid.  If the limitation or restriction 
falls outside the patent’s scope it must then be determined whether it 
“impermissibly” expands the patent right.  Impermissible expansion 
only occurs if (1) Supreme Court precedent has held the specific action 
per se invalid, or (2) under the anticompetitive effects test it imposes an 
unreasonable restraint on competition.89 
 
87. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 5, at 418–31 (noting the nod to precedent by 
excepting the Supreme Court’s per se holdings and criticizing the addition of the 
anticompetitive effects requirement in other situations); Hoerner, supra note 12, at 682–85.  
These commentators (and others) make the fair point that the Windsurfing justification for 
adding the requirement (“recent economic analysis question[ing] the rationale behind 
holding any licensing practice per se anticompetitive,” Windsurfing, 782 F.2d at 1002 n.9) 
finds no direct support in the case cited for the proposition, Blonder-Tongue Laboratories v. 
University of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971).  That case only references the 
Motion Picture/Morton Salt line of cases (discussed supra notes 54–74 and accompanying 
text) and the restriction of a patent holders’ rights to the “physical or temporal scope of the 
patent.”  Blonder-Tongue, 402 U.S. at 343.  However, although the Blonder-Tongue Court did 
not explicitly mention “anticompetitive effects,” a strong logical connection can be found in 
its analysis.  The line of earlier misuse cases cited expressed serious concern with the adverse 
market effects of the patent “monopoly” which connect directly to present day, albeit more 
nuanced, antitrust doctrinal competition concerns.  From that perspective the Federal Circuit 
may merely have been doing an artful job of using its limited ability to cabin the adverse 
effects of a Supreme Court doctrine that had outlived its usefulness.  See Mark D. Janis, 
Transitions in IP and Antitrust, 2002 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 253, 282 (2002) (noting the 
Federal Circuit’s “grudging acceptance” of the Court’s precedent); infra notes 251–56 and 
accompanying text (explaining the antitrust evolution justification for the Court’s overruling 
its misuse precedents); Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1329 n. 2 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (acknowledging the need to follow the Court’s existing misuse precedents); id. at 
1321 (noting the judge-made doctrine should not be applied “expansively”).  Additionally, 
although no certain inference can be drawn from a negative, the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in Windsurfing, 477 U.S. 905 (1986), meaning fewer than four of the Justices (if any) 
found the case sufficiently aberrational to merit review. 
88. See Princo, supra note 87; B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 
(Fed. Cir. 1997); Virginia Panel Corp. v. Mac Panel Co., 133 F.3d 860, 868–70 (Fed. Cir. 
1997).  The Federal Circuit may have briefly backed away from Windsurfing in Senza-Gel 
Corp. v. Seiffart, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  See Feldman, supra note 5, at 419–420; 
Hoerner, supra note 12, at 673–74.  However, Senza-Gel had not only an odd procedural 
posture but involved tying, which being governed expressly by Morton Salt thus fell within the 
exception expressly carved out under Windsurfing to the anticompetitive effects requirement.  
That would also be consistent with the Federal Circuit citing to Senza-Gel when making the 
point it remained bound by, and continued to honor, Supreme Court precedent.  See supra 
note 87.  In all events, the Federal Circuit clearly has resolved whatever concerns it may have 
had in favor of requiring anticompetitive effects whenever not explicitly prohibited by 
Supreme Court precedent. 
89. See id.; Janis, supra note 87, at 282–83. 
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The Supreme Court has yet to address the Federal Circuit’s 
“anticompetitive effects” test, having remained silent on the misuse 
doctrine’s substantive requirements for some forty years.90  Congress has 
acted twice, once before and once after Windsurfing.  Neither action 
provides definitive guidance regarding the Federal Circuit’s 
anticompetitive effects test. 
The first Congressional action, the 1952 codification of federal 
patent law, acknowledged the existence of the Court’s misuse doctrine.  
However, rather than expressly adopting and incorporating the Court’s 
patent policy-based “exceeds the scope” test, Congress instead added 
provisions limiting the doctrine’s application.91  Sections 271(b) and (c) 
defining inducement and contributory patent infringement were 
intended to override the doctrine’s threatened elimination of indirect 
infringement liability.92  Section 271(d) identified specific behaviors 
which do not constitute misuse.  In particular, responding to the Court’s 
evolving per se “tying equals misuse” jurisprudence, it explicitly 
confirmed a patent owner’s right to derive revenue from the sale or use 
of components which constituted less than the whole, but a material part 
of the invention. 
The 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act came after Windsurfing and 
offers better insight into Congressional thinking regarding the proper 
role of anticompetitive effects in misuse.  Once again the Act did not 
adopt misuse.  It only cut back on its judicial expansion.  Section 
271(d)(4) expressly precluded a misuse finding based solely on the 
owner’s decision not to use or a refusal to license a patent.93  The 
legislative history indicates Congress intended the provision to codify 
existing law, in effect confirming that misuse does not reach mere 
exercise of the patent right to exclude.94 
New Section 271(d)(5) explicitly addresses anticompetitive effects 
but only in a limited context.  It requires an affirmative showing that “in 
 
90. Not only did the Court deny certiorari in Windsurfing, 477 U.S. 905 (1986), but it 
has only made a few indirect references to the doctrine since that time.  See supra note 16. 
91. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 221–23 (1980); Charles 
W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for Patent Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 369, 379–88 (2006); Mueller, supra note 8, at 674–76; Giles S. 
Rich, Infringement under Section 71 of the Patent Act of 1952, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521 
(1953). 
92. The sections legislatively overruled the Supreme Court’s Mercoid decisions.  In 
those cases, the Court held a patent owner’s contributory infringement claims against 
suppliers of components having no other non-infringing use constituted patent misuse.  
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944); Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-
Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944). 
93. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2006). 
94. See Calkins, supra note 12, at 199; Mueller, supra note 8, at 678–79. 
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view of the circumstances, the patent owner has market power in the 
relevant market for the patent or patented product” as a predicate to 
finding misuse when a patent license is conditioned on “acquisition of a 
license to another patent or purchase of a separate product.”95 
What Congress intended by the 1988 statutory changes is 
ambiguous.  Regarding tying, it certainly substantially restricted the 
Morton Salt holding that insisting on use of goods falling outside the 
patent’s claims constitutes per se misuse.  The language does leave open 
the argument that Congress was merely limiting the per se violation to 
cases involving market power.96  The legislative record, however, makes 
it far more likely Congress wanted the misuse determination to be 
“guided by Supreme Court decisions in the context of unlawful tie-ins 
under the antitrust laws.”97  That means that whether or not tying 
constitutes a per se violation will be determined by the Court’s evolving 
antitrust analysis, not by misuse “scope of the patent” limitations.98 
In all events, Section 271(d)(5) clearly did not affirmatively adopt 
the Federal Circuit’s much broader anticompetitive effects requirement.  
Commentators convincingly argue that by failing to enact a 
contemporaneous Senate bill which would have expressly required an 
antitrust violation to find misuse, Congress intended to preserve the 
doctrine’s independence.99  By not acting, Congress certainly left the rest 
of the Court’s existing misuse doctrine intact.  However, reading non-
action as freezing misuse in its then existing form (whatever that might 
be) goes too far.100  The language of the Misuse Reform Act clearly did 
not explicitly codify any particular version of misuse (including 
whatever reading one might give to Supreme Court precedent).  It 
merely imposed limitations.  The failure to affirmatively adopt an 
“antitrust/competitive effects” standard does not constitute its 
permanent rejection.  It merely reflects the decision to leave in place the 
 
95. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5). 
96. See Calkins, supra note 12, at 197–98. 
97. Id.  As Professor Calkins points out, those antitrust decisions may still trigger per 
se liability (the Court’s antitrust tying jurisprudence is less than clear), but that would be a 
result of the antitrust assessment, and not because an independent misuse rule has been 
applied. 
98. The Court’s split decision in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 
U.S. 2 (1984), has left the antitrust per se-tying issue confused.  See HOVENKAMP, supra note 
27, § 10.3a.  
99. See Calkins, supra note 12, at 193–200; Feldman, supra note 5, at 420–24. 
100. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 425 (“The fact that Congress failed to approve . . . 
an antitrust analysis left the Federal Circuit still lacking the authority to alter the doctrine in 
this way, yet that is precisely what the court did in Mallinckrodt.”).  Whether the Federal 
Circuit had the authority to act as it did in light of Supreme Court precedent is a different 
issue.  See supra note 87. 
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status quo.101  Regarding misuse, that status quo leaves control over the 
doctrine with its originators and managers, the courts, subject only to 
the specific legislative limitations explicitly required by statute.102 
Whatever Congress may have intended (or how flagrantly the 
Federal Circuit may have flaunted that institution or Supreme Court 
precedent) the “anticompetitive effects” inquiry remains the practical 
reality at the coalface of judicial misuse determinations.103  As a result, it 
is more productive to leave these technical legal issues aside for the 
moment and address the antecedent underlying policy question: how 
useful is the misuse doctrine in today’s world?  That answer in hand, the 
Court or Congress can readily make the doctrinal adjustments necessary 
to produce the desired outcome, whether by directing the Federal 
Circuit to drop its anticompetitive frolic, fine-tuning the doctrine’s 
existing rules and remedies, or eliminating the doctrine entirely. 
PART II: THE ARGUMENT FOR ELIMINATING PATENT MISUSE 
A. The Current Situation–Why Worry?   
Misuse proponents correctly argue that the Federal Circuit’s 
approach substantially limits the misuse doctrine’s ability to constrain 
patent exploitation.104  Every patent owner action falling below the 
 
101. See Calkins, supra note 12, at 198 (noting Senator Deconcini’s statement that the 
rest of the misuse question was left to “address in the future”) and Feldman, supra note 5, at 
424 (noting Senator Leahy’s statement that rejection of the broader Senate proposal “does 
not mean that Congress has rejected” that position “and now believes that the traditional 
misuse doctrine should be retained intact . . . .  It only means that, because of the short time 
available at the end of this Congress, the House and Senate Committees interested in these 
issues were able to agree on a narrower reform.”). 
102. See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1329–1330 (Fed. Cir. 
2010).  The Princo decision also makes apparent the futility of trolling through the 
congressional history to discern greater limitations on court management of the doctrine.  
Compare id. at 1331 with id. at 1332.  Members of Congress undoubtedly had differing views 
on the reach of the doctrine (to the extent they had any at all—see supra note 101 (noting 
Senator Leahy’s point about the limited time available to devote to the issue)).  Better to 
stick to what the Act actually says and leave the rest to the courts.  If Congress becomes 
unhappy with the direction the courts take, it can make further adjustments.  An additional 
benefit of the status quo interpretation is it parallels the relationship between Congress and 
the courts regarding antitrust law.  That allows the two doctrines’ approach to patent power 
to evolve in tandem.  See infra notes 262–71 and accompanying text.  The approach does 
leaves the Federal Circuit constrained by existing Court precedent, but allows the Court itself 
to make such changes as it deems appropriate.  See supra note 87; infra notes 262–74 and 
accompanying text (arguing the Court should use that power to eliminate the misuse doctrine 
in its entirety). 
103. See supra note 88 (citing the numerous Federal Circuit cases to the present in 
which it has been applied, including the 2010 en banc decision in Princo, 616 F.3d 1318). 
104. That concern has been considerably heightened by the Federal Circuit’s en banc 
decision in Princo, 616 F.3d 1318.  The majority expressly stated its intent to limit misuse, 
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anticompetitive effects/antitrust standard, even those producing rights 
well beyond the physical or temporal scope of the related patent, will go 
unsanctioned. 
Recent events make the concern more than theoretical.  Patent 
owners have moved well beyond demanding returns from products or 
services outside the patent claims or for time periods after the patent’s 
expiration.  Disruption of industry standards, reverse settlement 
payments from patent owners to alleged infringers, non-producing 
patent owners’ interference with others’ productive activities and 
licensing terms limiting access to medical treatment and impairing 
innovation raise serious issues about the proper scope of patent 
exploitation.105  Efforts to address many of those issues through antitrust 
law have been resoundingly rejected by the courts based explicitly on 
the absence of demonstrable anticompetitive effects.106  One can 
reasonably suspect that the Federal Circuit’s heightened misuse 
standard creates a serious enforcement gap. 
In the existing efficiency driven legal paradigm, it is insufficient 
merely to point out that misuse prevents patent owners from imposing 
these costs on others.  As a properly functioning patent law intentionally 
limits third party access, it is necessary to determine whether the 
challenged action creates net system harms.107  Additionally, misuse does 
not come for free.  It is frequently pled, vigorously discovered and 
argued, and commonly appealed (albeit infrequently upheld).108  That 
direct expense, its uncertain application, and the draconian blanket 
unenforceability sanction both impose significant social costs and put a 
significant thumb on the scales in favor of refusing to deal,109 potentially 
 
characterizing it as “a judge-made doctrine that is in derogation of statutory patent rights 
against infringement.”  Id.  See also id. at 1342 (Dyk, J., dissenting) (stating that “evidently 
the majority thinks it appropriate to emasculate the doctrine so it will not provide a 
meaningful obstacle to patent enforcement”). 
105. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text. 
106. See, e.g., Ark. Carpenters Health and Welfare Fund, Paper, A.F. of L. v. Bayer 
AG (In re Ciprofloxacin), 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010), rehearing en banc denied, --- F.3d ----, 
2010 WL 3464382 (C.A.2); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 
(Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009); Schering-Plough Corp., v. FTC, 402 F.3d 
1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006) (pharmaceutical reverse payments); 
Rambus Inc. v. F.T.C., 522 F.3d 456 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1318 (2009) 
(standards ambush).  These cases indicate that antitrust doctrine could stand recalibration, 
but the issue in the text is not whether antitrust currently does an adequate job, but whether 
it cannot and thus justifies a separate misuse doctrine.  See infra Part II.B.1.b (discussing the 
point). 
107. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. 
108. See, e.g., Potenza et al., supra note 13, at 69. 
109. See, e.g., USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(noting the effects of “debilitating uncertainty”). 
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reducing patent access.  The misuse doctrine must produce some unique 
overall net improvement to justify its existence. 
The next section discusses how patent use can produce costs in 
excess of those inherent to the patent regime, justifying some form of 
legal intervention.  The following section looks at whether retaining an 
independent misuse doctrine provides sufficient distinct benefits to 
support its continued application, ultimately concluding that it does not. 
B. Excess Costs from Patents  
Early judicial decisions took a generous view of patent rights, 
leaving wide latitude in how related licensing transactions could be 
structured.110  In net efficiency improvement terms, that approach 
reflected a straight-forward calculation.  Society having decided to grant 
the patent owner the legal right to prevent all access by others, any 
permitted access, whatever the terms, must produce social benefits.  
Justice Holmes eloquently articulated the position his Motion Picture 
dissent: 
I suppose that a patentee has no less property in his 
patented machine than any other owner, and that, in 
addition to keeping the machine to himself, the patent 
gives him the further right to forbid the rest of the world 
from making other like it.  In short, for whatever motive, 
[the patent owner] may keep his device [the film feeder] 
wholly out of use [citation omitted].  So much being 
undisputed, I cannot understand why he may not keep it 
out of use unless the licensee, or, for the matter of that, 
the buyer, will use some unpatented thing in connection 
with it . . . . There is no predominant public interest to 
prevent a patented teapot or film feeder being kept from 
the public, because, as I have said, the patentee may 
keep them tied up at will while his patent lasts . . . . [I]f 
the owner prefers to keep the pot or film feeder unless 
you will buy his tea or films, I cannot see, in allowing him 
the right to do so, anything more than an ordinary 
incident of ownership.111 
 
110. See Calkins, supra note 12, at 178–80. 
111. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519–20 
(1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  It bears passing mention that Justice Holmes treatment of a 
patent as a property right does not explore whether different rights may attach to different 
kinds of resources and, in particular, the possibility that public policy (patent or otherwise) 
may limit a patent owner’s “bundle of sticks,” including the right to impose conditions on 
access. 
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In short, having given the patent owner the unilateral right to 
prevent all access, the owner’s decision to grant conditional access is 
better than nothing and, consequently, legal constraints on increased 
patent exploitation must worsen the public’s position. 
The majority opinion in Motion Picture provides the response: 
The [earlier Court decisions permitting ties] proceed 
upon the argument that as the patentee may withhold his 
patent altogether from public use, he must logically and 
necessary be permitted to impose any conditions which 
he chooses upon any use which he may allow of it.  The 
defect . . . springs from . . . [the] failure to distinguish 
between the rights which are given to the inventor by the 
patent law and which he may assert against the entire 
world and rights which he may create for himself by 
private contract, which, however, are subject to the rules 
of general law, as distinguished from those of the patent 
law.112 
As the majority points out, the logical flaw in the “some access is 
better than none” analysis is its exclusive focus on the benefits side of 
the equation.  It is true that a patent impairs efficient market operation 
by limiting access (the “rights given to the inventor by patent law”) and 
patent owners are generally free to refuse to deal with others at all.  It is 
also true that any increased access produces some efficiency 
improvement.  It is not true, however, that every increase in access 
produces a net improvement.  That determination requires examining 
the harms produced by the terms of access.  If those harms exceed the 
benefits then the transaction reduces efficient market operation overall 
and should be legally prohibited. 
In making the net assessment, the majority draws the important 
distinction between the costs arising directly from the patent right to 
exclude and those produced by “private contract”—the terms of access.  
The former reflects the inherent costs of the existing patent system.  A 
patent owner doing no more than exercising the right to exclude—
preventing access by refusing to deal—causes only the harms built into 
the regime.  If that produces net inefficiencies, the problem lies 
exclusively in the regime’s internal implementation.113  The appropriate 
fix involves adjusting the regime’s standards governing issuance and 
 
112. Id. at 514. 
113. The right to unilaterally refuse to deal and the right to unilaterally decide not to 
use a patent impose the only inherent harms from the patent right to exclude.  See supra 
notes 45 and 51 and accompanying text. 
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rights and/or remedies, not sanctioning owners for doing what patent 
law expressly permits. 
Privately constructed terms of access can produce additional costs.  
Those costs may be purely financial—a royalty paid for access.  Or they 
may arise from imposing other conditions on the licensee.  As the 
Motion Picture majority properly observes, such rights must be 
examined to determine whether their harms outweigh the benefits 
(including increased access). 
That net efficiency determination is the purview of “general laws.”114  
The extreme example of a patent royalty extracted at gunpoint provides 
a hyperbolic but instructive illustration.115  General law requires all 
market transactions comport with the efficient market assumption that 
the exchange reflect the voluntary decision of rational economic actors.  
Payments made under physical duress fail that requirement, so despite 
the increased access to the patented invention, contract law renders the 
transaction legally unenforceable.  Other general law requirements, 
such as fraud and antitrust law, similarly constrain the agreements 
regarding terms of access when they produce harms in excess of 
benefits.116 
Absent these general law constraints, increased access may, in 
efficiency terms, be worse for society than no access at all.  While the 
latter merely produces patent law’s internal net system efficiency 
improvement (additional innovation justifying the costs of reduced 
access), the former can impose additional costs producing a net overall 
efficiency decrease.  Such transactions must be legally prohibited.  The 
question is whether misuse doctrine contributes to accomplishing that 
goal.117 
 
114. General laws act as general limitations on every form of property ownership, a 
point that apparently failed to make an impression on Justice Holmes.  See supra note 111.  
Their role, however, is not to ensure the related property regime’s “internal” balances 
produce a net efficient outcome (in patent law the right to deny access and not to use oneself, 
supra notes 45 and 51 and accompanying text), but to ensure the use of any resulting rights 
does not impose additional costs. 
115. See POSNER, supra note 26, at 126 (making the point and noting the ex ante 
analysis leading to the result). 
116. For example, a similar analysis would apply to a patent license obtained through 
fraud.  Although such a license increases access, its terms do not reflect a net efficiency 
improvement (the licensee having been misled in some material way regarding the benefits to 
be obtained thus violating the perfect information assumption), and it will be rendered 
unenforceable by general laws addressing that requirement.  Although it operates in the same 
fashion, the key guardian of net efficient outcomes is antitrust law.  That regime’s operation is 
discussed infra notes 130–54 and accompanying text. 
117. As discussed earlier, the Court also supports the Motion Picture  holding by 
reference to patent exhaustion.  See supra note 54.  Rather than providing independent 
support for misuse, exhaustion targets the same concern (albeit in a more limited context, 
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Before turning to that question, it should be noted that the above 
analysis clarifies why misuse’s “exceeding the scope of the patent” 
inquiry fails to provide either useful guidance or proper outcomes.118  
That approach presupposes that some licensing terms are inherently 
“within” the patent right while others are not and that by distinguishing 
between them, undue social harms can be avoided.  But that assumption 
is false.  The only inherent patent costs, those technically “within the 
scope of the patent,” are those arising from exercise of the right to 
exclude—that is doing nothing more than refusing to use or license to 
others.  Ensuring that right produces optimal innovation outcomes 
requires patents only apply to invention (the qualification inquiry) and 
play a significant enough role in its production to merit the costs of 
excluding others during the patent term.119  The “within the scope of the 
patent” inquiry is therefore, entirely unrelated to the licensing terms 
inquiry.  In contrast, whenever a patent owner allows access, they have 
done more than exclude and any related condition may produce 
additional social costs.  Consequently, regardless of their nature, 
financial or otherwise, such terms lie “beyond the scope of the patent” 
and must be assessed for undue harms.120  The misuse requirement that a 
 
post-sale restrictions on patented devices) and thus its existence requires a similar 
demonstration that it provides unique value in policing against excessive costs/improper use 
of patent rights.   
118. As Professor Bohannan succinctly states the point: although the scope inquiry 
constitutes an “understandable attempt to ground the doctrine of IP misuse in IP policy,” it 
provides “little guidance on determining what falls ‘within’ or ‘outside’ the patent grant” and 
“produces both false positives and false negatives.”  See Bohannan, supra note 10, at 19–20. 
119. See MERGES ET AL., supra note 24, at 14–17; Chiappetta, Internet, supra note 39, 
at 320–23 (discussing the role of alternative forms of incentives). 
120. The Federal Circuits’ latest word on misuse in Princo, provides a useful 
illustration of how easily the “scope of the patent” inquiry can lead to dramatically under-
identifying problematic licensing terms.  See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 
1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  The majority makes the following observation regarding the inquiry 
into impermissible broadening of the patent grant: “[It] begins with substantial rights under 
the patent grant ‘includ[ing] the right to suppress the invention while continuing to prevent 
all others from using it, to license others, or to refuse to license, . . . to charge such royalty as 
the leverage of the patent monopoly permits,’ and to limit the scope of the license to a 
particular ‘field of use.’”  [citation omitted].  Given that the patent grant entitles the patentee 
to impose a broad range of conditions in licensing the right to practice the patent, the 
doctrine of patent misuse ‘has largely been confined to a handful of specific practices . . . .’”  
Id. at 1328–29.  Starting by assuming the patent owner has “substantial rights” vastly 
understates the potential problem.  A patent only “inherently” gives its owner the right to 
exclude others.  Every effort to exploit that right must be assessed for adverse effects under 
the circumstances.  See supra note 51 and accompanying text.  The fact that in some, even 
many, cases no undue harms will be identified, does not obviate the need to check; it is only 
by inquiring in each case that the proper determination can be made.  But that same logic 
argues powerfully against per se violations based solely on “exceeding the scope of the 
patent.”  See infra notes 178–89 and accompanying text (making the point that standing alone 
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court distinguish between conditions within and beyond the scope of the 
patent causes significant confusion and distraction while serving no 
useful purpose.121 
That understanding also defines the proper scope of the misuse 
justification inquiry.  Internal calibration errors, such as inadequate 
standards for grant or an excessively long patent term, are internal 
design flaws.  Attempting to make the necessary adjustments through 
misuse deploys an indeterminate doctrine to illogically punish a patent 
owner for errors beyond his control.  Implementation shortcomings 
should be addressed through direct legislative modification of the 
offending statutory provisions.  If misuse has a useful role, it must come 
from some special value it produces in controlling the exploitation of 
properly calibrated patents. 
 
post-term royalties are not necessarily harmful).  And, ultimately, it argues for eliminating 
the doctrine entirely, doing away with its artificial distinctions and focusing on the actual 
effects of the particular licensing terms.  See infra note 121.  That may well be precisely what 
the Princo majority, constrained by Supreme Court precedent, was seeking to do—by 
expansively defining the scope of the patent right and requiring the harm come directly from 
licensing terms gives misuse very little range of application.  See supra note 104. 
In all events, the Motion Picture majority had the point fundamentally correct, articulating 
the crucial distinction as between “rights which are given to the inventor by patent law” (the 
right to exclude) and those “rights which he may create for himself by private contract” (the 
terms of access).  Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 514 
(1917).  Unfortunately, the Court’s subsequent misuse jurisprudence failed to follow this 
sound approach, ultimately framing misuse as involving those actions which extend the 
physical or temporal scope of the patent.  See supra note 51; infra note 123. 
121. The problem is clearly visible in the Princo case.  The majority found the harm 
arose from an alleged separate agreement between two patent holders to license one patent 
and suppress the availability of the other.  As that collateral arrangement did not produce 
anticompetitive conditions imposed in the resulting patent license, it “had no bearing on the 
physical or temporal scope of the patents in suit,” no extension could occur and misuse did 
not apply. Princo, 616 F.3d at 1340.  The dissent vigorously protested that the agreement 
protected the licensed patent from competition and therefore extended the scope of that right 
(monopoly).  Id. at 1342–1343.  But the debate fails to advance what all agreed was the actual 
concern—whether the patent licensing arrangement caused undue social harm.  Forcing 
courts to engage in a distracting and ultimately meaningless scope of the patent debate only 
makes an already complicated inquiry more difficult.  Moreover, the pointlessness of the 
effort ultimately argues for eliminating the doctrine entirely–focusing the inquiry explicitly on 
assessing the efficiency effects of licensing terms, rather than going through the charade of 
labeling those which are found permissible as “within the scope of the patent.”  The theatre 
of the absurd discussion in Princo over whether misuse can be predicated on an “ancillary” 
antitrust violation reinforces the point.  See id. at 1336, 1354 (Dyk, J., dissenting).  Misuse 
proponents generally argue the doctrine should extend beyond antitrust law to fill gaps left by 
that regime (see infra Part II.C.1).  That they find themselves seeking to define the “exceeds 
the scope of the patent” misuse trigger by anti-competitive effects makes the actual misuse 
issue clear. 
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C. The Argument against an Independent Misuse Doctrine   
The Supreme Court clearly intended that misuse would apply 
independently of violations of general law, most specifically antitrust 
law.122  The articulated purpose was to prevent patent owners from 
extending their rights beyond the physical (claims) and temporal (term) 
of the patent,123 thus avoiding costs beyond those necessary to “carr[y] 
out [the] public policy adopted by the Constitution and the laws of the 
United States ‘to promote the Progress of Science and the useful 
Arts.’”124 
The judicial creation of a distinct, patent-policy based misuse 
doctrine does not justify its continued existence.125  Within the efficiency 
paradigm, a potential problem exists any time patent exploitation 
generates costs exceeding those inherent in the patent right to exclude.  
The law should provide appropriate mechanisms for reviewing such 
actions and preventing those that produce net harms.126  Preserving 
misuse as the vehicle for doing so requires identifying some specific 
value that only defensive application of the scope of the patent inquiry 
and blanket unenforceability remedy can provide. 
1.  The Antitrust “Gap” Justification for Misuse   
The most frequent justification is made in the negative: because 
numerous patent transactions escape antitrust sanction, misuse 
examination fills an essential “gap” in that regime’s application. 
 
122. In Motion Picture and Morton Salt, the Court expressly declined to determine 
whether the identified harms to the competitive environment constituted an antitrust 
violation.  See supra notes 64–65, 75 and accompanying text.  In Zenith Radio, the Court went 
further, explicitly stating that misuse did not turn on the existence of an antitrust violation.  
See supra note 83.  Although recent Federal Circuit decisions include an antitrust-like 
anticompetitive effects requirement, that court has confirmed that “patent misuse is viewed 
as a broader wrong than antitrust violation . . . [that] misuse may arise when the conditions of 
antitrust violations are not met” (C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340, 1372 (1998)) 
and “[t]he patent misuse doctrine, born from the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, is a 
method of limiting abuse of patent rights separate from the antitrust laws” (B. Braun Med., 
Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (1997)).  Ironically, the most recent misuse decision, 
Princo, 616 F.3d 1318, triggered the opposite argument—whether misuse can be found based 
merely on an antitrust violation.  See supra note 121. 
123. See Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971). 
124. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942). 
125. If a change is appropriate, then conflicting Supreme Court precedent must be 
addressed.  But that is an easily resolved matter of mechanical implementation.  See infra 
notes 260–74 and accompanying text. 
126.  When that happens is not clearly identified under current misuse doctrine, which 
was originally developed primarily in reaction to the (relatively) straightforward tying 
requirements.  See supra notes 54–74, 118–21 and accompanying text.  But that problem 
remains secondary to determining whether the misuse doctrine should exist at all. 
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a. The Market Power Gap   
The problematic gap is commonly attributed to antitrust law’s 
“market power” requirement.127  The argument runs as follows: most 
patents face sufficient (frequently stiff) competition from alternatives.  
As a result, their owners lack the power to cause antitrust competitive 
harm and consequently fall below the antitrust radar.  As a result, the 
vast majority of owners can extend their patent rights without fear of 
antitrust sanction.  Misuse is necessary to avoid the resulting excess 
social costs. 
The first three statements are correct.  Antitrust law does permit 
many conditional patent transactions because the patent owner has 
insufficient market power.128  The last statement is not.  The antitrust 
market power is not a flaw in the system causing the regime to “miss” 
harmful transactions.  Rather it serves an essential role in ensuring 
antitrust law fosters overall efficient market operation.  Filling the gap 
by prohibiting these transactions through an independent misuse 
constraint does not prevent market harms.  It interferes with an 
assessment mechanism specifically designed to ensure the law advances 
the overall system net improvement goal.129 
A brief review of the role of power in antitrust law provides the 
explanation.  At the far power extreme, Sherman Act Section 2130 
applies to individual market participants either holding monopoly 
power or having a dangerous probability of acquiring such power.131  A 
patent conferring such power triggers serious concerns and close 
scrutiny imposing substantial constraints on exploitation. 
Although misuse proponents do not identify the “power gap” with 
Section 2, examining how it deals with potential patent exploitation 
 
127. The more specific form of the argument is that antitrust law’s market power focus 
makes it  inadequately sensitive to patent policy concerns, in particular, ensuring compliance 
with the claims and term limitations designed to prevent excessive costs and interference with 
innovation.  See, e.g., Bohannan, supra note 10, at 13–18; Feldman, supra note 5, at 400–01 
(but also noting that even with market power, antitrust may provide insufficient constraint); 
Mueller, supra note 8, at 654–56, 671–72 (also noting the focus of misuse is on expansion of 
the patent grant, while antitrust focuses on anticompetitive effects in a relevant market).  The 
excessive costs and innovation impairment arguments are separately considered below in Part 
II.C.2. 
128. The Court having (properly) done away with the presumption that a patent 
produces market power, in fact, makes this much more likely.  See Ill. Tool Works Inc., v. 
Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 43–45 (2006). 
129. Cf. Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 774–77 (1984) (pointing 
out that the market power “gap” is “the sensible result of a purposeful policy decision by 
Congress”). 
130. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
131. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ch. 6. 
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harms provides useful insights into antitrust law’s basic approach.  
Despite the fact that monopoly power poses a serious threat to market 
efficiency, Section 2 distinguishes between acquiring/using such power 
“on the merits” and the “monopolization” offenses.132  That distinction 
reflects the key role net efficiency plays in all antitrust policy and 
doctrine.  Monopoly power is the ultimate motivation for market 
competition and the logical consequence of its successful pursuit.  Fining 
and jailing the winners would considerably chill desirable market 
behavior, including curbing enthusiasm for participating at all.133  To 
avoid that problem, antitrust “monopolization” violations require more 
than a dominant market position or the reasonable possibility of 
obtaining the same.  It must be accompanied by a “predatory act”—
some interference with competition beyond the unavoidable 
consequences of the monopolist’s own skill, foresight, and industry.  The 
latter permits capture of the returns from “winning on the merits”—for 
example, by creating better products at lower costs or through a 
legitimately acquired natural or legal advantage, including a patent.134 
The inevitable consequences exception precludes imposing antitrust 
liability on owners of legitimately acquired patents merely for denying 
access to others.  Even when the patent produces monopoly power, a 
unilateral, unconditioned exclusion produces no more harm than 
expressly contemplated by patent law.  To treat such refusals to deal as 
an independent misuse violation would make nonsense of the patent 
system.  The appropriateness of that antitrust outcome has been 
explicitly acknowledged in misuse doctrine, both by the Court’s 
exemption of patent owner actions falling within the “physical and 
temporal scope” of the patent135 and by Congress in Section 271(d)(4) of 
the Patent Act.136 
When a patent owner goes beyond refusing to deal, antitrust law 
assesses every condition for unjustified anticompetitive effects.  When 
monopoly power is present, anything beyond the “inevitable 
 
132. See id. at 269–71. 
133. See Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 
407 (2004) (“The mere possession of monopoly power, and the charging of monopoly prices, 
is not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system.”); U.S. v. 
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (criminalizing mere possession of a 
monopoly would “not only be unfair, but contrary to the intent of Congress . . . [t]he 
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he 
wins”). 
134. See, e.g., Verizon Commc’n Inc., 540 U.S. at 407; U.S. v. Grinnell Corp, 384 U.S. 
563, 570–71 (1966); Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 430. 
135. See supra note 123 accompanying text. 
136. Codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2006). 
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consequences” of the patent, that is, merely refusing to deal,137 will 
trigger significant Section 2 concerns.  A violation will be found if no 
offsetting efficiency justification is shown, something which has proven 
exceedingly difficult for monopolists to do in practice.138  As applied, 
Section 2 enforcement arguably exceeds the limitations imposed by 
misuse, preventing every net harmful use of a patent right.139  
Doctrinally, however, the antitrust approach is more consistent with the 
system efficiency goal.  Rather than focusing on the patent’s “scope,” it 
examines the transaction’s actual market effects, permitting those few 
arrangements that, even with monopoly power, produce a net overall 
gain. 
Understandably, the misuse proponents’ antitrust market power gap 
argument focuses on the vast majority of patent owners who do not 
meet the substantial Section 2 monopoly power requirements.  As a 
result, those potent antitrust restrictions do not reach, much less 
prevent, actions by myriad patent owners who may cause significant 
harm.  However, those owners do not receive an antitrust free pass.  
Those falling below the Section 2 power requirements remain subject to 
Sherman Act Section 1140 and Clayton Act Section 3.141 
 
137. Even a refusal to deal can be an antitrust violation if it is accompanied by a 
predatory act.  See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 
(1985) (the termination of an existing relationship found predatory on the facts).  But see 
Verizon Commc’n, 540 U.S. at 409–10 (noting Aspen lies at the outer limits of liability).  
Additionally, there has been off and on discussion of an antitrust “essential facilities 
doctrine” which would address the clog on competition from legitimately gained advantage, 
even absent a predatory act.  See U.S. v. Terminal R.R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 224 U.S. 283 
(1912).  But see Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410–11 (expressing considerable skepticism regarding its 
existence or usefulness but not explicitly repudiating it); Mueller, supra note 8, at 655–56 
(discussing other commentators’ proposals to use the essential facilities doctrine to address 
industry standards capture and concluding (correctly in my view) that the courts are unlikely 
to extend antitrust law along these lines).  The essential facilities doctrine improperly ignores 
that when a patent owner does no more than refuse to deal, it does not create any efficiency 
harms beyond those inherent in the patent regime.  If the patent regime is internally 
inefficient, then we should adjust its rules of grant and rights/remedies.  See infra Part III.B.1.  
If it is efficient, but we desire outcomes different than those produced by an efficient market, 
then we should address that issue directly.  See infra Part III.B.2. 
138. If monopoly power is present or likely to be obtained, virtually every condition 
has the potential to “unnecessarily exclude,” and will require a substantial showing.  In most 
cases that will be impossible to do.  See Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d at 430–31 (“It was not 
inevitable . . . .”); U.S. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 344 (1953) (“Yet they 
are not practices that can be properly described as the inevitable consequences . . . .”), aff’d 
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, § 6.4a. 
139. If a monopolist can convince a court that the condition falls within the scope of 
the patent, misuse would not apply even if it produced net harms to the marketplace.  See 
supra notes 118–21, 123 and accompanying text. 
140. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).  
141. Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 14.  The Federal Trade Commission can also proceed 
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Sherman Act Section 1 applies to “every contract, combination or 
conspiracy . . . in restraint of trade.”142  To be “in restraint of trade,” an 
arrangement must both harm competition and have a net adverse effect 
on efficient market operation.143  Although a small number of Section 1 
per se violations exist, such as naked horizontal price fixing and market 
divisions, the vast majority of arrangements undergo Rule of Reason 
assessment.144 
Finding a violation under the Rule of Reason requires 
demonstrating the challenged arrangement have some adverse effect 
competition.145  If plausible adverse effects exist, the defendant then may 
offer justification.  Justification requires showing the restriction is 
essential to, and the least restrictive means of, producing a specific 
market efficiency improvement.146  If that cannot be done, the restriction 
violates Section 1, whether or not the defendant has market power. 
A properly justified restriction then undergoes net positive effects 
assessment to determine if the identified efficiency improvements 
outweigh the harms.147  Market power plays a significant role in this 
inquiry.148  If those involved control a large share of a relevant market, 
the likelihood that power can be used to produce net negative outcomes 
tips the balance in favor of finding an antitrust violation.  However, 
when competition sufficiently limits their ability to insist, the 
 
under Federal Trade Commission Act § 5 (15 U.S.C. § 45).  Some question remains as to 
whether that antitrust authority extends to situations which do not constitute violations of the 
Sherman Act or Clayton Act (which are clearly included).  See HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, § 
15.2. 
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1. 
143. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text (describing the operation of the 
antitrust Rule of Reason). 
144. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, ch. 5.  The assessment occurs on a continuum 
requiring varying levels of factual inquiry, including a quick look which can vary from a 
“twinkling of an eye” to a more “sedulous” factual review.  See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass’n v. 
F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756 (1999); Ind. Fed’n of Dentists v. F.T.C., 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (the inquiry 
turns on the specific circumstances of the case). 
145. Inherently suspect restrictions may be deemed sufficiently problematic that harm 
is presumed.  See NCCA v. Regents, 468 U.S. 104, 110 (1984); Licensing Guidelines, supra 
note 35.  Other restrictions may necessitate a more detailed look at the restriction in the 
specific market context to assess if it will produce any adverse effects.  See supra note 144, 
discussing the variability of the “quick look” inquiry.  Misuse proponents point to this 
antitrust law’s focus on competition as a separate rationale for an independent misuse 
doctrine which focuses primarily on innovation.  That issue is discussed infra at Part II.B.2.b.  
146. See Ariz. v. Maricopa Cnty Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 353–54 (1982); Law v. 
NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998); HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, § 5.1c; 
Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 35. 
147. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text (describing the antitrust Rule of 
Reason). 
148. See Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 35, §§ 1.2, 1.32–1.33, 4; Licensing 
Guidelines, supra note 35, § 4.3. 
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determination can be left to the market’s invisible hand.149  If the 
arrangement produces net efficiencies (e.g., better products and/or 
lower prices despite the competitive restrictions), demand will migrate 
to the participants.  If not, demand will move to better performing 
alternatives. 
Clayton Act Section 3 adds an additional nuance to the Section 1 net 
effects inquiry regarding foreclosure effects arising from tying and 
exclusive dealing arrangements.150  A Clayton Act Section 3 violation 
requires showing the arrangement’s effect “may be to substantially 
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.”151  The courts have 
treated that requirement as placing a modest thumb on the net-negative 
outcome side of the Rule of Reason scale.  Specifically, Clayton Act 
liability can arise even when the direct effects of the defendant’s actions 
do not produce net harms, but create overall problematic foreclosure 
when combined with others’ actions, either in the aggregate or as 
reflecting a market trend.152  As a result, even relatively weak players 
 
149. When a transaction is characterized as vertical, it receives much more circumspect 
antitrust review.  See, e.g., AREEDA, supra note 27, at 567 n.48 (citing, among others, Judge 
Richard Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania 
Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14 (1977) (to the effect that the Rule of Reason applied to 
vertical agreements is “in practice it is little more than a euphemism for nonliability”)).  
Reduced scrutiny does not, however, mean antitrust law ignores the possibility of harm.  The 
decision to permit vertical restrictions must still be based on an affirmative determination 
that under the circumstances the restraint is a necessary element in producing sufficient 
offsetting benefits to produce a net improvement.  Market power plays an important role in 
that decision.  But as in other Rule of Reason assessments, the decision to permit a vertical 
restraint based on lack of market power is not a gap in enforcement.  It reflects the 
affirmative determination that sufficient competitive alternatives exist to reasonably assume 
that the restraint will in fact produce net overall benefits.  See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 
U.S. 3, 15–16 (1977) (citing Chief Judge Posner’s decision below noting that attempts to 
impose undue restrictions “would just drive the dealers into the arms of a competing 
supplier”); Cont’l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 52, n. 19 (1977) (“[W]hen interbrand 
competition exists . . . it provides a significant check on the exploitation of intrabrand market 
power because of the ability of consumers to substitute a different brand of the same 
product.”).  Vertical transactions involving end-users will receive yet more relaxed scrutiny as 
they constitute the basic engine of the market economy.  See Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 
U.S. 128, 137 (1998).  But again, a failure to sanction reflects that on net, such transactions 
produce more benefit than harm.  See id. (rejecting application of a per se rule). 
150. Professor Bohannan identifies foreclosure as the key issue in misuse situations.  
See Bohannan, supra note 10, at 3 (identifying market efficiency/innovation adverse effects as 
well as the need to ensure access to the public domain; also noting the latter justification 
applies to non-patent regimes lacking patent law’s virtually absolute right to exclude, as 
discussed supra note 10).  As argued below in the text, identifying the foreclosure concern 
does not justify misuse; that requires that misuse provide a better response than antitrust law 
to the problem. 
151. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (2006).  
152. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, § 10.9e (making the point that the relevant 
inquiry is not the defendant’s share of market sales but the level of overall market 
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can face antitrust prohibition when the overall market situation 
produces substantial barriers to entry. 
In setting the intervention threshold for Clayton Act Section 3 
foreclosure concerns, the Court uses power/market share as a tool for 
reaching a proper balance between avoiding foreclosure harms and the 
benefits of aggressive competition.153  As with other antitrust 
assessments, the absence of power can tip the balance toward a net 
benefits finding, allowing the arrangement to survive scrutiny because 
competitive market forces can reliably determine whether the 
arrangement is net superior to the alternatives. 
Finally, the antitrust violation thresholds under the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts reflect one important additional consideration.  If bringing 
and maintaining an expensive legal action is too easy or sanctions are 
too quickly imposed, antitrust law can itself interfere with the aggressive 
competition which drives market efficiency.154  The thresholds must, 
therefore, reflect a balance between avoiding actual or incipient harms 
and permitting too-ready pursuit and sanction of “false positives” which 
can unduly chill desirable activity. 
Many patent transactions will meet neither the Sherman Act Section 
1 nor even the, perhaps, lower Clayton Act Section 3 market power 
requirements.  Misuse proponents are, therefore, entirely correct that 
antitrust law will permit many transactions which cause harms beyond 
those inherent in the patent right to exclude.  However, that does not 
result from an inadvertent enforcement “gap” in antitrust law.  Rather it 
reflects an affirmative decision to accept harms when they produce net 
improvements.  Applying an independent misuse doctrine would indeed 
 
foreclosure). 
153. The courts presently require a significant showing of power or foreclosure to 
intervene.  In Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984), the Court 
indicated that a tying violation  might require over a thirty percent market share, at least 
absent showing of other market harms.  Similarly, exclusive dealing violations currently are 
rarely found when aggregate market foreclosure is under forty percent.  See HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 27, §§ 10.3a, 10.9e.  Professor Bohannan makes the valid point that these levels fail 
to prevent many incipient harms, most particularly foreclosure affecting innovation.  See 
Bohannan, supra note 10, at 21–24, 31–34.  That does not make the antitrust outcome 
“incorrect.”  As explained in the text, the objective is not to prevent all harms, but to ensure 
net benefits from restrictions on competition.  In all events, even if antitrust law has it wrong 
that does not alone justify misuse.  If lower thresholds are necessary, recalibrating antitrust 
law (including perhaps returning to the Court’s earlier views on exclusive dealing foreclosure 
effects) is preferable to deploying the even less suitable misuse doctrine.  See infra notes 159–
67 and accompanying text.  The specific application to patent policy innovation concerns is 
considered below in Part II.B.2.b. 
154. See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 
226–27 (1993); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 122 n. 17 (1986); 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986). 
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prevent the costs.  But it would also deny society the related net 
benefits, thus impeding the pursuit of the system objective of enhancing 
overall market efficiency.155  Moreover, by putting patent owners at a 
disadvantage relative to other market participants (who would only be 
subject to antitrust constraints), misuse unnecessarily undermines the 
value of patents and the innovation incentive policies pursued by the 
regime.156 
b. Antitrust Enforcement Uncertainties/Costs and Doctrinal/Remedial 
Shortcomings   
Commentators have also identified the practical uncertainty and 
costs of applying the Rule of Reason as well as various doctrinal and 
remedial antitrust insufficiencies, as justifying misuse.157 
Antitrust law is extremely fact intensive and its vague and complex 
real world application requires substantial time and financial resources 
from both private litigants and the public.  These and other practical 
considerations, such as standing requirements, frequently prevent 
bringing or succeeding in an otherwise meritorious antitrust case.158 
Additionally, there are good arguments that the regime has moved 
too far toward avoiding false positives and non-intervention.  Current 
doctrine imposes extremely stringent proof requirements on plaintiffs 
with regard to pleading, proof and substantive showings.159  The D.C. 
Circuit decision in Rambus v. Federal Trade Commission160 and the 
Federal Circuit decision in Princo Corp. v. International Trade 
 
155. See supra notes 26–36.  This straightforward analysis begs the question of how the 
Supreme Court could have missed the point in its early cases establishing the misuse doctrine.  
The answer is all in the timing.  Those seminal cases were decided well before the Court had 
established the more-nuanced net efficiency Rule of Reason inquiry in antitrust law.  As such, 
they are best understood as representing a temporary fix, holding the line until a more 
refined analysis could be developed.  See infra notes 262–66 and accompanying text. 
156. See infra Part II.B.2.b (discussing the innovation policy justifications for misuse).  
157. See Bohannan, supra note 10, at 9; Feldman, supra note 5, at 420 (noting the point 
and citing to Robert P. Merges, Reflections on Current Legislation Affecting Patent Misuse, 70 
J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y, 793, 794 (1988)). 
158. See AREEDA, supra note 27, at 61–69 (discussing standing limitations); Cotter, 
supra note 14, at 8 (making the point in connection with misuse). 
159. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec., 475 U.S. at 595 (regarding proof of agreement); Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–558 (2007) (pleading requirements to survive a 
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim); Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 
U.S. 756, 789 (1999) (regarding proof of competitive harm); Brooke Grp. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993) (regarding the recoupment requirement 
in predatory pricing cases); supra notes 149, 153 (respectively discussing vertical restraint 
review and the substantial the market shares and foreclosure required to prove a tying or 
exclusive dealing violation). 
160. Rambus v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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Commission161 provide two good misuse-relevant examples.  In Rambus, 
the defendant belonged to a trade group considering adoption of an 
industry standard.  The Federal Trade Commission found it violated the 
antitrust laws by failing to disclose and then asserting patents it held 
covering the standard ultimately adopted.  The court of appeals 
reversed.  It found that the FTC had not demonstrated the necessary 
predicate anticompetitive harm because its evidence did not eliminate 
the possibility the standard might have been adopted even with full 
disclosure.162  That holding appears to impose a “but for” standard of 
causation in antitrust cases; a burden of proof notoriously difficult to 
carry.163 
In Princo, the defendant infringer alleged that the patent owner had 
engaged in licensing practices which foreclosed competition in a 
potential alternative technology.  The Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, 
held that to prove misuse the defendant infringer must establish that the 
action had anticompetitive effects.  Applying antitrust principles, the 
majority found that this required the defendant to present evidence 
demonstrating that “there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that the . . . 
technology . . . would have matured into a competitive force.”164  That 
means to prove a violation involving suppression of an as yet fully 
developed technology, the proponent must carry the very substantial 
burden of overcoming the myriad technical and commercial 
uncertainties associated with moving from concept to viability.165 
These cases raise legitimate concerns that current antitrust law will 
not produce the net benefit outcomes required of the regime.  However, 
these are errors of implementation, not policy.  They call for bettering 
aligning antitrust doctrine with its policy mandate, not revisiting the 
goals themselves.  Using misuse to accomplish these same ends would 
involve not merely addressing the same cost/uncertainty issues,166 but 
 
161. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
162. See Rambus, 522 F.3d at 464–67. 
163. See Michael A. Carrier, The D.C. Circuit’s Error in Rambus and a More Justifiable 
Framework for Causation and Standard-Setting 13 (Apr. 8, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1586430 (criticizing the standard as too high a bar and 
arguing for “legal cause” as a more workable alternative). 
164. Princo, 616 F.3d at 1351. 
165. See infra notes 210–11 and accompanying text (discussing the issue in connection 
with the innovation-fostering justification for misuse).  The dissent in Princo also made the 
valid argument that the majority erroneously placed the burden of proof on the defendant 
infringer in the first instance.  See Princo, 616 F.3d 1318 at 1353–54 (Dyk, J., dissenting). 
166. The absence of a clear justification guiding the “scope of the patent” inquiry also 
makes misuse exceedingly complex, uncertain, and expensive in practice.  See supra note 108 
(discussing the expense); supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing the practical 
effects of applying the “scope of the patent” test). 
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would require dramatic change in the doctrine’s fundamental 
approach.167  Moreover, the result of even a successful effort would be to 
create a doctrine largely paralleling and duplicating antitrust law. 
Finally, it has been argued that the misuse blanket unenforceability 
sanction both more immediately and effectively addresses the adverse 
access effects of patent overreaching and provides stronger deterrence 
reducing the problem in the first instance.168  As others have cogently 
explained, the doctrine’s lack of remedial nuance makes it far more 
likely to over or under-react.169  Antitrust law provides for substantially 
more flexible relief based on the actual harm.  Injunctions and damages 
address the adverse effects on individual participants and the market, 
while mandatory trebling and criminal liability for the most egregious, 
per se violations more appropriately calibrate deterrence to the specific 
wrong. 
2.  Patent Policy Justifications for Misuse   
The alternative misuse justification points to the special role the 
Court assigned misuse in Motion Picture and Morton Salt–ensuring 
proper implementation of patent policy.170  The approach produces three 
possible justifications: Misuse is essential to prevent (1) excessive 
financial returns through escape from patent regime’s internal temporal 
 
167. The “scope of the patent” inquiry would have to be significantly adjusted to avoid 
prohibitions on transactions producing net benefits.  See id.  Moreover, its defensive-only 
application and remedial approach would need to be reconsidered.  See supra notes 76–82 
and accompanying text; infra notes 220–21 and accompanying text. 
168. See Chronopoulos, supra note 8, at 800–01 (making the argument in the industry 
standards setting); Princo, 616 F.3d at 1354 (Dyk, J., dissenting).  But see generally 
Chiappetta, Standards, supra note 8 (arguing that standards setting requires more nuanced 
remedies to avoid interfering with desirable private ordering). 
169. See supra note 14. 
170. See Calkins, supra note 12, at 187 (articulating the point rather than advocating it 
and properly noting this is the “strongest argument”); Feldman, supra note 5, at 400; Mueller, 
supra note 8, at 671–72; Potenza, supra note 13, at 96–99; supra notes 54–72 and 
accompanying text (discussing Motion Picture and Morton Salt).  It can also be validly argued 
that antitrust law fails to consider important non-efficiency related harms, for example, 
distributional outcomes or behaviors regarded as morally repugnant for non-efficiency 
reasons.  There are two related responses.  First, those normative issues play little role (in fact 
arguably no role) in current patent policy.  If we want our patent law to pursue goals other 
than economic efficiency, that requires a wholesale revisiting of goals falling well beyond 
anything misuse can accomplish.  See infra Part III.B.2.  Second, other existing laws 
specifically address those concerns, for example tax and social program regimes 
implementing redistributional objectives and criminal statutes enforcing behavioral norms 
despite related inefficiencies.  Cf. Nynex Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 137 (1998).  If 
they are not producing the desired outcomes, we should expand our inquiry to examine the 
larger legal picture rather than focus solely on adjusting patent law. 
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(term) and physical (claims) cost mitigating limitations;171 (2) harms to 
innovation inadequately addressed under antitrust law Rule of Reason 
assessment;172 and (3) unjustified acquisition or assertion of patent 
rights.173  Each is considered and rejected below. 
a.  Excessive Financial Returns   
The argument is straightforward: to ensure an appropriate net 
beneficial outcome, patent law specifically restricts the right to exclude 
to the claimed invention174 for a specified period of time.175  When patent 
owners obtain financial returns beyond those limitations, they exceed 
their due causing harms beyond those society has agreed to bear.  That 
reasoning captured the Court’s imagination in its seminal misuse 
cases,176 leading to the formulation that actions exceeding a patent’s 
scope constitute per se misuse.177 
This appealing analysis, however, fundamentally misconstrues the 
operation of patent law’s claims and terms limitations.  The Court 
holding in Brulotte v. Thys Co.178 prohibiting all post-term royalty 
obligations provides a good framework for demonstrating the 
 
171. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 400, 436–39. 
172. See id. at 400–01, 439–49; Potenza, supra note 13, at 98. 
173. Commentary on misuse generally treats acquisition and assertion issues as distinct 
concerns.  Although that tracks the Court’s approach to misuse, a complete inquiry into 
justifications must consider whether it adds value by preventing any use of the patent system 
creating unjustified harms.  See infra Part II.C.2.c (discussing improper acquisition and 
assertion).  
174. Infringement occurs when there is any making, use, sale, offer to sell, or 
importation into the United States of the patented invention.  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).  
That invention is defined by the claims.  See 35 U.S.C. § 112. 
175. See 35 U.S.C. § 154. 
176. The Court’s early misuse decisions explicitly focused on confining patents to the 
regime’s internal restrictions on returns, in particular to the patented invention as defined by 
the claims.  See supra notes 54–72 and accompanying text.  Professor Feldman takes the 
Court’s argument to the important next step, focusing on why misuse is required to produce 
that outcome.  The argument starts from the proposition that “[w]here no market power 
exists, antitrust would be unconcerned by extensions of the time or scope of the patent” 
leaving an enforcement gap which can be usefully filled by the misuse doctrine’s automatic 
prohibition on any conditions “beyond the scope of the patent.”  See Feldman, supra note 5, 
at 436–38.  As discussed in the preceding section, antitrust law is concerned with such 
extensions and prevents them when and only when they produce net efficiency harms.  The 
more precise issue, therefore, is whether the harms permitted by antitrust law net assessment 
are inconsistent with patent policy.  The possibility of excessive financial returns is examined 
in the following text.  Other harmful effects on patent law’s innovation objectives are 
addressed in the following section. 
177. See supra notes 54–72 and accompanying text; supra note 123. 
178. See Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), rehearing den., 379 U.S. 985 (1965).  
The decision has been roundly criticized by commentators in the past, for much the same 
reasons discussed in the following text.  See, e.g., Cotter, supra note 14, at 2 n. 18. 
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problem.179  In Brulotte, the Court reasoned that imposing such a royalty 
requirement constituted a “bald attempt to exact the same terms and 
conditions for the period after the patents have expired,” projecting the 
monopoly beyond the patent period.180  As a result the Court held post-
term royalty requirements were per se misuse. 
Patent law’s fixed term clearly serves to cap the patent owner’s 
financial returns and related social cost of the right to exclude.  The 
Brulotte decision equally clearly assumes that for the term limitation to 
have the desired cost-limiting effect it must act as an absolute 
prohibition on royalty payments after the patent has expired.181  
Although the first statement is accurate, the second does not survive 
scrutiny. 
The “excessive returns” inquiry starts by determining the inherent, 
and thus acceptable (or at least accepted), maximum payment for access 
to a patent as contemplated by patent law’s “limited times” restriction.  
Neither the Constitutional nor the statutory time limitation speaks in 
terms of when return on the patent can be received.  Instead they 
restrict the period of time during which a patent owner can prevent 
access/use by others.182  The contemplated maximum financial return 
and related social cost is, therefore, equal to the value to others of 
accessing/using the patent during that period of exclusive control.  In 
“misuse” patent policy terms, that means excessive returns only exist 
when a patent owner receives more than that value.  The relevant 
“extension of the monopoly” post-term royalty inquiry, therefore, is not 
 
179. Professor Feldman uses this example in her discussion of the time and scope 
extension financial returns problem.  See Feldman, supra note 5, at 400, 436–39.  The 
argument starts from the proposition that such extensions could continue in perpetuity free of 
antitrust objection in the absence of market power, meaning antitrust law effectively changes 
the “patent rules to say that a patent lasts for twenty years, but the twenty-year limit only 
applies fully to patent holders who have market power” and, therefore, “limiting the inquiry 
to behavior that violates antitrust law ignores significant issues for patent policy.”  See 
Feldman, supra note 5, at 438.  The argument is cogently made, but to clarify, antitrust law’s 
Rule of Reason assessment would permit post-term royalties whenever the extension 
produces net benefits, even if the patent owner has market power.  See supra notes 34–37 and 
accompanying text. 
180.  Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 32.  
181. See id. 
182. The Constitution provides that Congress may “secur[e] for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”  
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  Section 271(a) of the Patent Act defines infringement as the 
making, using, etc of the patented invention “during the term of the patent therefor.”  35 
U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006).  It can, of course, be argued that the Constitution and the statute have 
it wrong, but that would make nonsense of the misuse “scope of the patent” inquiry.  
Moreover, the efficiency arguments in the text indicate that if the incentive is to come from a 
patent right to exclude, then fixing the term of the control, not when returns can be received, 
produces the better net outcome. 
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when payment occurs, but whether the discounted present value of the 
aggregate royalty payments exceeds the value of accessing the patent 
during its (remaining) term.183 
The market ensures that equivalence will always exist regardless of 
when actual payment is made.  In a hypothetical completely efficient 
market, patent owners cannot “project the patent monopoly beyond the 
patent period” because they lack the requisite power.184  Any attempt to 
extract royalties exceeding the value of access during the term will push 
licensees to the less expensive alternatives.  When, as is more likely the 
case, the patent owner has some (or even substantial) market power, a 
surplus will be obtained.  However, that surplus will not exceed the 
extra value to licensees of using the invention over the alternatives 
during the period they are legally denied access.185  Any attempt to 
obtain more will make the otherwise less satisfactory alternatives 
competitive, causing potential licensees to forgo the patented solution.  
Any “monopoly surplus” will, therefore, equal the return (and incentive 
to invent) contemplated by patent law’s “limited time” restriction.186 
In the absence of excess financial returns a misuse prohibition of 
post-term royalties causes affirmative social harm.  By unnecessarily 
limiting flexibility in private-ordering regarding timing of payments, it 
prevents licensing arrangements involving non-conforming financial 
circumstances (for example, using time payments as a financing 
 
183. The total absolute amount of royalties paid will vary depending on timing, with 
longer payouts generally exceeding shorter term payouts in the aggregate amount.  Those 
differences, however, reflect deferred payment considerations such as time-value of money 
and uncertainty/risk allocations.  Justice Harlan’s dissent in Brulotte makes these points.  See 
Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 34 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
184. As the Court recently discussed in Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, Inc., 
547 U.S. 28, 41–45 (2006), the early misuse cases confusingly use the market power term 
“monopoly” to identify patent exclusivity.  That was not, however, inadvertent.  The misuse 
cases, including Brulotte, were specifically concerned that patent owners would distort the 
market by using the power afforded by their patent.  See Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 32 (“We are . . . 
unable to conjecture what . . . resultant arrangement might have emerged had the provision 
for post-expiration royalties been divorced from the patent and nowise subject to its leverage.” 
(emphasis added)). 
185. Justice Harlan’s dissent provides a helpful analysis along these lines.  See Brulotte, 
379 U.S. at 36–38 (Harlan J., dissenting).  The more likely explanation for Brulotte is the fear 
of patent power before antitrust filled the gap.  See infra notes 263–66 and accompanying text. 
186. This analysis identifies an important remedial issue.  Post-term royalties are later 
payment for value already received (the value of access to the patent during its term).  
Consequently the post-term failure to pay should likely be treated exclusively as a damages 
matter.  Granting an injunction prohibiting practicing the invention would produce in 
terrorem leverage related to sunk costs and prevent competitive use despite the clear 
indication that money provides a sufficient remedy.  See infra note 290.  Only if other 
considerations are in play would an injunction be appropriate. 
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mechanism or tool for allocating uncertainty risks)187 and individual 
preferences (use now, cash later).188  That, in turn, unduly restricts access 
and exploitation of the patented invention, producing unjustified 
inefficiencies.189  Moreover, imposing these unjustified limitations on 
exploitation of patented inventions makes them less competitive than 
unpatented alternatives.  The resulting impairment of the regime’s 
incentives needlessly (and ironically) interferes with the very patent law 
promotion of innovation policy misuse purportedly exists to protect. 
Interestingly, the Court’s assessment of non-tying extensions of a 
patent’s physical scope came out very differently.  In Zenith Radio 
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.190 the Court considered a royalty 
computed based on the licensee’s total sales, including products not 
incorporating the patented invention.  Under Morton Salt, the attempt 
to obtain payment based on matter “not embraced in the invention” 
should have been per se misuse.191  Instead the Court permitted 
flexibility in structuring, holding that “if convenience of the parties 
rather than patent power dictates the total-sales royalty provision there 
 
187. Professor Feldman makes the additional argument that post-term payments may 
permit the patent owner to extend the time-limited opportunity to obtain returns as, for 
example, when the market is not yet ready to appreciate the invention’s value.  See Feldman, 
supra note 5, at 445.  But as explained in the text, potential licensees will only commit to post-
term royalties equal to the value of access during the patent term.  That calculation will 
reflect both timing benefits and risks.  Only if obtaining access during the term provides 
sufficient value (for example, reduced present cash flow, head-start, market share capture) 
will a licensee sign on, and then only for the value obtained from access prior to expiration.  
Otherwise, they will wait until the patent expires. 
188. The argument might be made that if post-term royalties are prohibited, rather 
than forego these transactions, patent holders will simply reduce the price to get whatever the 
licensee is willing and able to pay during the term (something is better than nothing).  Cf. 
Feldman, supra note 5, at 448 (noting the choice, not arguing the point).  But that is not how 
the market and the patent system interact.  In a fully competitive market, the royalty rate will 
reflect the lowest profitable price.  Consequently, rather than produce incremental returns, 
additional sales at lower rates will not only produce an economic loss but adversely affect the 
return on all licenses to the extent the owner cannot effectively discriminate.  If power 
produces a premium, the patent owner will structure its license output to maximize its return 
in light of demand.  Again, additional lower-cost transactions generally will not only fail to 
produce incremental gains, but harm the owner’s overall return.  In the messy real world, 
such reductions will, of course, occur and produce extra access.  But that does not justify 
imposing barriers to flexibility which can produce yet further improvements. 
189. Post-term royalty obligations do have foreclosure effects on competitors, both 
existing and potential new entrants.  A rational licensee will consider those effects from their 
perspective (incorporating the effects on their freedom to change) and insist on related 
concessions (such as optional outs or reductions in price).  However, power may preclude 
getting the desired concession and, in all events, merely because a term benefits both parties 
does not mean it causes no social harm.  See infra Part II.C.2.b (discussing foreclosure and 
related effects on innovation).  
190. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969). 
191. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 492 (1942). 
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is no misuse of the patents and no forbidden conditions attached to the 
license.”192  In short, misuse requires the patentee to have used “the 
power of his patent to insist on a total-sales royalty.”193  Stated 
affirmatively, when the licensee voluntarily accepts a royalty formula 
extending the physical scope of the patent, not only is there no per se 
misuse, but there is no misuse at all.194 
The Court’s Zenith Radio analysis can be readily connected to the 
logic against treating post-term royalty payments as misuse.  A licensee 
will voluntarily accept (and may even propose) the administratively 
cheaper total-sale royalty provision when it does not impose overall 
costs exceeding the value of gaining access to the claimed invention.  
The Court, however, failed to go the next step.  The focus on patent 
power obscures the fact that even when “coerced” a total sale royalty 
will not produce excess royalty returns.195  Even under market power 
pressure no rational licensee will agree to pay more in aggregate than 
the value of obtaining access to the patented invention.196  Although 
they will accept a surplus over the alternatives, that surplus will not 
exceed the market value of the patented invention’s superior 
performance over those alternatives.  If it does, they will move to the 
alternatives.  Any surplus produced by a “beyond the claims” royalty 
formula will merely reflect the incentive that patents are expressly 
 
192. See Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 138 (citing to the rationale of convenience and 
efficiency in royalty computation acknowledged in Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine 
Research, Inc., 399 U.S. 827 (1950)).  The Court, perhaps rethinking its ringing per se finding 
in Brulotte, noted that case was not to the contrary as it only “articulated in a particularized 
context the principle that a patentee may not use the power of his patent to levy a charge for 
making, using, or selling products not within the reach of the monopoly granted by the 
Government.”  Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 136–37. 
193. Zenith Radio Corp., 395 U.S. at 139. 
194. Id. at 135, 140.  Reading the Court’s holding regarding the absence of 
power/coercion in the misuse context as indicating in such circumstances resulting terms are 
always per se valid goes too far.  As implied by the Court’s analysis and as discussed below in 
the text and infra notes 218–25 and accompanying text, every licensing term must undergo an 
antitrust assessment.   
195. The holding in Zenith Radio does not explicitly make a total sale royalty imposed 
through power/coercion per se misuse, but it might fairly be interpreted as implying that 
outcome.  The Court’s focus on power and its adverse effects is not surprising.  It is consistent 
with the reasons it developed misuse.  That concern is now better addressed by modern 
antitrust law, making the power/coercion versus voluntary “misuse” distinction drawn in 
Zenith Radio as irrelevant as the doctrine itself.  See infra notes 263–67 and accompanying 
text. 
196. The same “no harm” argument has been made regarding the impossibility of 
excess financial returns from tying.  See Bohannan, supra note 10, at 16–17 (discussing the 
discrediting of the dual monopoly theory); HOVENKAMP, supra note 7, at 10, 36; 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 27, § 8.3c.  That is not to say that licensees (and licensors for that 
matter) will not make mistakes.  But that problem is distinct from the argument that such 
arrangements always impose excess costs and, therefore, justify per se prohibition.   
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designed to produce.  As with post-term royalties, treating total sales 
royalties as misuse, to say nothing of a per se violation, merely because 
they exceed the patent’s claims unnecessarily reduces beneficial 
flexibility in licensing transactions.  That, in turn, artificially constrains 
access, reducing patent returns and impairing the regime’s incentives to 
innovation. 
Preventing licensing terms exceeding patent law’s term and claim 
limitations to avoid excessive “internal” financial returns not only fails 
to justify misuse, it raises serious concerns about the doctrine’s efficacy 
in application.197  However, that does not conclude the matter.  Access 
conditions can have other kinds of adverse efficiency effects.  Post-term 
and total sale royalty obligations interfere with migration to 
alternatives.  Additionally, patent returns need not be received as cash 
payments.  They can impose limitations on licensee behavior (for 
example restricting sourcing or research and development activities).  
Although for the reasons explained above, such restrictions will produce 
an equivalent transactional “price” (and return), they can raise other 
concerns, in particular those articulated in the second patent policy 
justification for misuse, adverse effects on innovation. 
b.  Harm to Innovation   
This patent policy justification derives directly from the Court’s 
early misuse reference to the regime’s constitutional mandate that 
patents should only impose social costs essential to progress the useful 
arts–that is, spur innovation.198  Unquestionably patent licensing terms 
can adversely affect innovation.  Post-term and total sales royalties and 
minimum use and exclusivity requirements reduce market demand for 
 
197. The internal balances analysis reinforces the fundamental difficulty with misuse’s 
“scope of the patent” test.  Because it does not accurately reflect the crucial difference 
between inherent costs from refusing to deal and the potential harms arising from any term 
imposed on access, it will both over-react (the beyond the term and claims per se violations) 
and under-react (failing to consider conditions on access found to be within the patent’s 
scope).  See supra notes 118–21 and accompanying text. 
198. See supra notes 54–72 and accompanying text (discussing the early misuse cases).  
Although the Court’s seminal misuse decisions do explicitly reference patent law’s innovation 
promotion goals, the cases focus on ensuring that patent owners do not exceed the “scope of 
the patent” as defined by their invention; that is, they do not obtain rights or impose costs 
beyond those necessary to the regime’s promotion of innovation.  Proponents of the 
innovation justification discussed in this section seem to go a step further, arguing that the 
Court sought to protect future innovation itself.  See Feldman, supra note 5, at 401, 431, 445–
49; Potenza, supra note 13, at 98–99.  See also Bohannan, supra note 10, at 1–4, 20–22 (noting 
that innovation is one justification offered for the doctrine).  Whether or not that latter 
argument finds technical support in the Court’s misuse decisions, it makes sense to inquire 
into whether it can support misuse. 
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new products.  Agreements not to develop alternative offerings or 
improvements and grant-back provisions prevent or reduce research 
and development by those perhaps most motivated and particularly 
well-suited to do so.  Tying provisions can impair new entry/improved 
performance in the primary market and stifle innovation in adjacent 
markets.  Reach-through royalty stacking burdens upstream 
implementations and new developments, including extensions into new 
markets. 
Antitrust law examines every licensing term for net adverse 
efficiency effects including those identified above.199  The innovation 
justification for misuse must therefore identify some way the antitrust 
inquiry fails to sufficiently address patent policy innovation concerns.  
That argument can take two somewhat overlapping forms.200  The pure 
form treats promoting innovation as an independent goal, something 
pursued apart from all other considerations.201  That would make 
antitrust law’s willingness to trade-off harms to innovation to obtain 
other benefits entirely inappropriate.  The second accepts antitrust law’s 
net outcome approach but argues its doctrinal application inadequately 
addresses innovation concerns. 
The pure “no trade-off” position is untenable.  Pursuing innovation 
at all costs would put patent law at odds with the overall system goal, a 
goal the regime’s own internal structure clearly reflects.  Absolute 
priority would require foregoing net improvement transactions, thus 
affirmatively moving the market away from, rather than toward, the 
goal of maximum operational efficiency.202  Even patent law, which 
 
199. See supra notes 142–47 and accompanying text. 
200. Commentators making the innovation argument are not precise in their concerns, 
both articulating innovation as a distinctly important goal of the patent system (and therefore 
perhaps having primacy and exempting innovation harms from Rule of Reason net effects 
assessment) and arguing that some innovation harms escape antitrust notice (perhaps as a 
consequence of the market power gap, perhaps because antitrust law fails to give proper 
attention to innovation concerns (either failing to see them or failing to give them extra 
weight)).  See Feldman, supra note 5, at 401, 431, 445–49; Potenza, supra note 13, at 98–99.  
See also Bohannan, supra note 10, at 20–22 (noting innovation as one aspect of the doctrine’s 
justification).  The various arguments are discussed in the following text. 
201. No one appears to rely on the pure argument; it is included only for completeness.  
Cf., Potzena, supra note 13, at 99 (arguing that antitrust fails to address “stifling of innovation 
in an unfair manner” implying perhaps that innovation deserves at least some level of 
preferential treatment). 
202. See supra Part I.A (discussing the integrated system effort required to align the 
real world with the efficient market theory).  The Court’s misuse holdings are consistent with 
the position in the text.  They do focus on patent policy and, in particular, the regime’s 
objective of promoting the useful arts, but rather than arguing for progress of the useful arts 
at all costs, they impose limitations designed to ensure patent law incentives cause no 
unmerited harm to the market.  See supra note 198. 
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exists primarily, if not exclusively, to foster innovation, explicitly rejects 
the innovation first approach.  Its internal rules are explicitly designed 
not to maximize innovation at all costs, but to produce optimal 
incentives in light of the countervailing costs.203 
The second argument, that antitrust assessment does not properly 
consider innovation concerns, also comes in a pure and more nuanced 
form.  The pure form–that antitrust entirely fails to consider innovation 
at all–can be quickly dismissed.  Even assuming antitrust law constrains 
Rule of Reason inquiry to harm to competition,204 interference with 
innovation easily qualifies.  Innovation plays a particularly critical role 
in market competition, producing the essential elements of the invisible 
hand—alternative offerings, improved functionally, and lower 
production and distribution costs.  Every term impeding the ability to 
innovate will be taken seriously by antitrust law.205 
If an antitrust insufficiency exists, it must arise from a specific 
deficiency in actual application.  Proponents have raised a number of 
related arguments.  The most common identifies antitrust law’s alleged 
“market power gap” as the culprit, arguing that it causes antitrust law to 
permit many transactions that interfere with innovation.206  The reasons 
for dismissing that argument in its general form discussed earlier207 
provide a useful starting point for addressing it in the innovation 
context.  Every licensing term, including those harmful to innovation, 
triggers antitrust analysis.  Some (even many) survive review because 
the patent owner possesses insufficient market power.  That is not 
because antitrust law failed to give innovation its due.  Rather, it reflects 
a finding that despite the innovation harms, the transaction produced a 
net efficiency gain under the circumstances.  Treating these transactions 
differently merely because they involve innovation constraints would 
 
203. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. 
204. Antitrust law’s focus on market “competition” does not mean it only considers 
direct impediments such as agreements not to compete.  Net “competition” assessment is 
broadly read to reach anything that may impair or improve effective operation of the invisible 
hand, including transactions costs, foreclosure effects, and information asymmetries.  See 
supra notes 34–37, 146 and accompanying text. 
205. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 33, § 1.5c; Verizon Commc’n Inc. v. Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (discussing the need in antitrust law to 
“safeguard the incentive to innovate”). 
206. See Bohannan, supra note 10, at 4, 20–22; Feldman, supra note 5, at 446–47; 
Potenza, supra note 13, at 98–99.  If the reason for giving primacy to innovation involves non-
efficiency goals (for example, protection of the small inventor or preventing “morally” 
reprehensible interferences), those justifications involve fundamental changes to the existing 
efficiency paradigm and are better addressed directly rather than through the misuse label or 
adjustments to existing legal doctrine.  See infra Part III.B. 
207. See supra Part II.C.1.a. 
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produce two unmerited consequences.  First, it would mirror the 
“innovation first” position, thus moving the overall system and patent 
law away from their goal of maximizing efficient market operation.  
Second, it would treat patents less favorably than alternative offerings, 
thus affirmatively interfering with, rather than promoting, patent law’s 
innovation agenda. 
A more specific variation on the market power argument focuses on 
“incipient” harms to innovation.208  Exclusive dealing transactions 
provide one good illustration.  Even when few have adopted the 
approach, the limitations imposed can nonetheless restrict ready access 
to necessary inputs and markets by smaller or more locally constrained 
innovators.  Another example involves ensuring appropriate protection 
for emerging technologies having unclear and uncertain paths to success 
because of development and market risks.209 
Misuse proponents correctly point out that although antitrust law 
identifies and considers these foreclosure problems, their limited or 
uncertain effects can lead the courts to find no sufficiently demonstrable 
harm.210  As a result, no net outcome assessment will be made, letting 
potential harms to innovation slip through the antitrust net.  Again, 
mere lack of antitrust prohibition does not justify misuse; the latter 
doctrine must improve the situation.  Making that determination 
requires exploring the reasons behind current antitrust law non-
intervention.  An appropriate legal response to limited or 
incipient/uncertain harms to innovation must do more than identify such 
harms exist.  It must effectively deal with the costs of prohibiting the 
challenged restrictions.  The current antitrust proof of harm standards 
and incipiency thresholds do this by considering the adverse effects of 
too ready legal intervention as part of the net benefit assessment 
process.211  That requires setting the bar sufficiently high (and absorbing 
some related innovation harms at the margin) to prevent legal claims 
 
208. See Bohannan, supra note 10, 27–35; Feldman, supra note 5, at 447–48 (antitrust 
law focuses on anticompetitive effects on particular markets; patent policy concerns extend to 
“system-wide effects that may hinder the overall progress of science”).  The “incipiency” 
problem is not unique to innovation; it raises difficulties for every plaintiff seeking to 
demonstrate cognizable antitrust harm exists.  See supra notes 153–54, 159 and accompanying 
text. 
209. The protection of nascent technologies was a central issue in Princo.  Princo Corp. 
v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010).  The majority specifically found that 
the defendant infringer’s failure to prove that a potentially competitive, but as yet 
undeveloped, technological alternative was sufficiently viable to raise antitrust 
anticompetitive concerns.  Id. at 1334–1335; see supra notes 164–65 and accompanying text. 
210. See supra note 208. 
211. See supra notes 153–54 and accompanying text. 
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which are too easily made from chilling desirable vigorous market 
competition.   
Current antitrust doctrine likely does not adequately perform this 
delicate balancing act.212  But once again, the misuse doctrine’s defensive 
only application, poorly calibrated “scope of the patent” inquiry and 
blanket unenforceability lack the necessary nuance to provide a useful 
alternative solution.  Although we might make adjustments to misuse, 
they would go well beyond tinkering with its doctrinal implementation 
to revisiting its overall structure.213  The existing antitrust shortcomings 
regarding harms to incipient innovation are better addressed within the 
approach and experience of that regime. 
Professor Feldman offers an interesting variation on the “incipient 
harm” concern in her discussion of Reach-Through Royalties.214  Such 
provisions provide patent owners returns from products developed by 
the licensee through use of their patents.  The arrangement allows 
licensors and licensees to share the risks of research and development 
investment by predicating returns on successful outcomes.  As such, 
they increase access and use of the patent.  However, they also create 
remote and potentially numerous down-stream rights-holders.  That 
fragmentation of rights can create anti-commons type interference with 
“efficient exploitation of the [follow-on] invention” thus impairing 
innovation.215  Again, antitrust law’s net effects approach takes these 
adverse effects on innovation into account, but also considers the gains 
from improved access.216  When an arrangement produces a net 
improvement, permitting the transaction advances both the overarching 
system goal and patent policy.  If current antitrust doctrinal 
requirements fail to produce this outcome, the appropriate response is 
to adjust its rules, not apply the even less effective doctrine of patent 
misuse.217 
 
212. See supra notes 159–65 and accompanying text (discussing the likely over-concern 
with false positives). 
213. See supra notes 165–69 and accompanying text. 
214. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 439–48. 
215. Id. at 447. 
216. See supra notes 174–97 and accompanying text (discussing the same access issue in 
connection with post-term and total sale royalties). 
217. The conclusion in the text does not mean patent rights fragmentation and anti-
commons concerns are not serious problems.  It only argues that misuse does not provide the 
appropriate response.  The problem arises from patent law’s virtually absolute right to 
exclude as the mechanism for providing incentives to invest in innovation.  When patent 
owners holding such rights employ net efficient mechanisms for increasing access, they 
promote rather than hinder the overall system goal.  It makes no sense to take such owners’ 
patents away from them.  If the joint patent and antitrust law outcome does not produce what 
we desire, that shortcoming should be addressed directly. If the problem lies in 
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The final variation argues antitrust law’s market power focus creates 
a “blind spot” regarding voluntary transactions.218  Many antitrust 
opinions focus on power/coercion as the touchstone for finding a 
violation.219  That may mean that the regime will fail to consider harms 
to innovation caused by terms willingly accepted by licensees. 
The response both reinforces that the antitrust approach is superior 
to misuse, doctrinally and as a matter of policy, and demonstrates why 
the voluntary transaction concern is a non-issue.220  To trigger misuse, 
the patent holder must first assert the patent, substantially limiting the 
doctrine’s ability to address and rectify innovation concerns arising from 
voluntary transactions.  For example, if mutually agreed total-sales 
royalties are causing foreclosure, non-infringing competitors seeking to 
open the market to a non-infringing offering have no misuse standing to 
complain.  The existing licensees, who have taken those effects into 
account when deciding to enter into the agreement, are unlikely to feel 
challenging the requirement merits the associated costs and risks 
(including to the licensor relationship), particularly as misuse gives them 
no right to any monetary compensation.  Additionally, if misuse 
ultimately renders the patent unenforceable, the licensee and the overall 
market may find the now royalty-free patented invention more 
attractive then the alternatives, actually increasing the barriers to the 
new entry by innovators. 
Antitrust challenge is far more likely and effective.  Anyone harmed 
by the related impairment of competition can challenge the 
arrangement, including innovators suffering foreclosure effects on their 
alternative offerings.221  Additionally, the federal or a state government 
agency may bring an action, either in response to a private complaint or 
 
implementation, we should make the related adjustments.  If it arises because we desire 
something other than efficient market outcomes, we should expressly add those 
considerations to our antecedent normative debate.  See infra Part III.B. 
218. Cf. Feldman, supra note 5, at 447–48 (raising a concern in connection with the 
Court’s focus on “coercion” in Zenith Radio, a misuse case). 
219. The Court’s focus on market power is a proxy for the ability to coerce by escaping 
the constraints of competition.  See supra notes 149, 153, 195 and accompanying text.  See also 
Collaboration Guidelines, supra note 35 (discussing the Guidelines which use the absence of 
power as a safe-harbor). 
220. See supra notes 74–80 and accompanying text (describing the differences in 
approach); supra note 14 (noting commentators making the remedial superiority point). 
221. Professor Bohannan raises the good question of whether alleged foreclosure of a 
new product not yet introduced (or even developed) is sufficient to give its developer 
antitrust standing.  See Bohannan, supra note 10, at 35.  Cf. Princo, 616 F.3d at 1350 (Dyk, J., 
dissenting; noting the related problem of proving damages).  However, for the reasons 
discussed in the text, in the likely event antitrust standing is not appropriately calibrated the 
appropriate response is to make changes to those rules, not application of the even more 
poorly calibrated misuse doctrine. 
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on its own initiative.  The sanctions for violation will include an 
injunction requiring adjustments to the terms of access (which likely will 
be less than making the patent available royalty-free to all) and 
compensatory damages.  Moreover, mandatory treble damages and the 
grant of reasonable attorneys’ fees provide substantial incentives to 
bringing private actions and, together with fines, provide considerable 
deterrence to a patent owner imposing over-reaching access restrictions 
in the first instance. 
On the merits, antitrust law subjects all agreements to Rule of 
Reason assessment.222  That an arrangement was entirely voluntary (or 
mutually beneficial) neither exempts it from review nor dictates the 
outcome.  The efficiency review focuses on net market effects, not 
participant desires.  Antitrust law’s application to horizontal price fixing 
and market divisions provides a ready example.223  The parties to such 
agreements affirmatively seek the individual benefits of limiting 
competition between them.  However, to survive antitrust review they 
must demonstrate the arrangement is an essential element in producing 
a net market efficiency improvement.224  If they cannot, the transaction 
will constitute a per se violation triggering treble damages and in many 
instances criminal sanctions.225  In such cases, the agreement falls not 
merely despite the parties’ voluntary agreement and their desire to 
obtain its benefits but in large part for those very reasons. 
Patent transactions are similarly assessed.  If a term adversely affects 
innovation, it must be justified by showing a net overall improvement in 
 
222. See supra notes 34–37, 145–49 and accompanying text (discussing the Rule of 
Reason).  Interestingly, misuse raises a potentially even more serious problem, exempting all 
conditions, whether voluntary or involuntary, which fall within the scope of the patent.  See 
supra notes118–21 and accompanying text (discussing the problems with the scope of the 
patent inquiry). 
223. See Sullivan, supra note 36, § 1.5a. 
224. In the early days of Sherman Act § 1 enforcement, defendants did attempt to 
argue the individual benefits defense, albeit articulated in “system” terms, such as avoiding 
the damaging effects of cutthroat competition, guaranteeing fair (reasonable) returns and 
preserving future capacity.  The courts rejected those arguments, focusing instead on efficient 
market operation as the means for producing the appropriate outcomes.  See U.S. v. Socony-
Vaccuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); U.S. v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 292 (1927); 
Sullivan, supra note 36, §§ 5.3e, 5.3f.  See also AREEDA, supra note 27, at 115–19. 
225. In fact, in such cases, no showing of market power is required.  See Socony, 310 
U.S. at 845 n. 59 (finding it was “the illegal character of the restraint not the amount of 
commerce affected” and a violation exists “though it is not established that the conspirators 
had the means available for accomplishment of their objective”).  Although Socony was the 
high water mark of per se liability, those rules still apply to naked (unjustified) horizontal 
price-fixing and market divisions.  The Department of Justice aggressively pursues such 
arrangements and significant sanctions are imposed, including jail time for the individuals 
involved. 
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market performance.  If that cannot be done, the term violates antitrust 
law despite its voluntary and mutually beneficial nature. 
In summary, whether the patent transaction is coerced or voluntary, 
whether the harm is existing, incipient or uncertain, antitrust law 
identifies and addresses all actual or potential adverse effects on 
innovation.  Imposing antitrust sanction, however, requires such effects 
must be harmful on net to efficient market operation, both in light of 
the benefits produced and the chilling effects of overly aggressive legal 
intervention.  To the extent existing antitrust doctrine does not produce 
that outcome, the problem is an implementation short-coming, not one 
of approach.  Attempts to rectify such problems through misuse would 
require a far more complex, time-consuming, and expensive effort 
merely to create a duplicative cause of action. 
c. Unjustified Acquisition or Enforcement of Patents   
A conditioned licensing transaction at least provides the benefit of 
increased access.  In contrast, the unjustified acquisition or assertion of 
a patent is undesirable by definition.  The law recognizes the difference 
and has developed separate doctrines addressing these special patent 
concerns.  A gap in their application might justify a distinct misuse 
doctrine.226 
i.  Improperly obtained patents.   
Limiting issuance of unjustified patents is a substantial concern of 
any patent regime.  Such patents produce no social benefit and all 
related costs are inherently excessive.  Even if never asserted, their 
existence causes distortions in market behavior, requiring inquiry into 
their scope and validity, which triggers attempts to design around and 
causes foregone use, for fear of infringement. 
Many “bad” patent problems involve patent applicants who follow 
the rules but because of improper legal standards governing grant or 
errors in review, obtain undeserved patents.227  An independent misuse 
 
226. It might be argued that these doctrines form part of a general patent misuse 
regime.  Although they certainly police against abuse of the patent system, that semantic 
argument misses the point of the justification inquiry.  It would be equivalent to claiming that 
antitrust law constitutes part of the patent misuse doctrine.  The question is whether the 
misuse doctrine as currently defined and applied by the courts–defensive, scope of the patent 
inquiry, blanket unenforceability–should continue to exist, not redefined to include other 
existing legal doctrines designed to prevent the identified harm. 
227. Numerous factors contribute to the existing problems, ranging from the need to 
refine standards for patentability (subject matter, novelty/obviousness), inadequate funding 
of the Patent and Trademark Office access to prior art and the need to improve post-grant 
review.  See supra note 50; infra notes 287–88 and accompanying text; Chiappetta, Internet, 
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doctrine targeting behavior conforming to existing requirements and 
procedures makes no sense.  It illogically punishes compliance while 
doing nothing to address the actual problem.  Implementation failures 
require modification of the problematic internal issuance standards and 
examination by an adequately funded and staffed Patent Office 
equipped with the necessary tools and review procedures.228 
If “misuse” occurs, it involves applicant acts or omissions that 
interfere with the application of properly calibrated rules and 
examination procedures.  Patent law’s inequitable conduct doctrine 
specifically targets that issue.229  It sanctions applicant 
misrepresentations (affirmative or by omission) to the Patent Office 
when found material to the patentability inquiry (not merely when 
determinative to the outcome on the merits) and made with intent to 
deceive.230  Such a misrepresentation is sufficient for finding a violation; 
it need not affect the actual validity of the patent on the merits.  The 
doctrine’s application and remedy roughly parallel misuse–providing a 
defense to alleged infringements (rather than an affirmative claim) and 
resulting in the blanket unenforceability of the related patent’s claims.231 
Many question the efficacy of the current inequitable conduct 
 
supra note 39, at 333–39 (discussing the issues in connection with ensuring the quality of 
business method patents). 
228. See generally supra note 227.  The issue is complicated by the fact that such 
adjustments themselves impose costs, requiring a separate net assessment of the related 
changes and investments.  See infra Part III.B.1.  One way to reduce the public cost would be 
to internalize it into the acquisition of the patent right by requiring patent applicants provide 
affirmative assistance, such as performing a search and providing the results with their 
application.  See infra note 235 and accompanying text.  The failure to do so might be 
considered “misuse” as discussed below in the text. 
229. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW 
AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 1102 (4th ed. 2007); Janis, supra note 87, at 262–68 
(discussing the origins and evolution of the doctrine).  The “Walker Process doctrine” 
permits antitrust claims using the act of fraudulently obtaining a patent as the predatory act 
for proving monopolization or attempt to monopolize under Sherman Act § 2.  See Walker 
Process Equip. Inc. v. Food Mach. and Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175–79 (1965).  Although 
the Walker Process doctrine thus constrains improper patent acquisition, it fits more 
comfortably with, and is discussed in connection with, improper assertions of such patents 
infra at notes 242–52 and accompanying text. 
230. See, e.g., Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365 
(Fed Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1595 (2009) (“To successfully prove inequitable 
conduct, the accused infringer must present “evidence that the applicant (1) made an 
affirmative misrepresentation of material fact, failed to disclose material information, or 
submitted false material information, and (2) intended to deceive the [PTO].”).  The specifics 
of both the “materiality” and “intent” requirements remain, or to put it tactfully, elusive.  See 
Therasense v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rehearing en 
banc granted, 374 Fed.Appx. 35 (Fed.Cir.(Cal.) Apr 26, 2010).   
231. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 229, at 1106–07 (citing to J.P. Stevens & Co. v. 
Let Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). 
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doctrine.232  Serious concerns have been raised concerning its practical 
effect on patent prosecution, both as a result of confusion over its 
requirements and the substantive obligations it imposes (whatever they 
may be).  Commentators point out that its uncertain disclosure and 
intent requirements drive over-submission and under-explanation,233 
increasing the burdens and costs of obtaining a patent (as well as the 
public costs of administration).  Substantive ambiguity also makes 
infringement claims riskier, more time consuming and expensive.  These 
problems make patents less desirable and less able to perform their 
incentive function. 
Finding the appropriate balance involves numerous considerations: 
the costs imposed by improperly issued patents, the costs of eliminating 
them (including dealing with unavoidable ambiguity and error in patent 
prosecution) and the patent regime’s need to deliver appropriate 
incentives at reasonable cost in a reasonable time.234  Some have so 
despaired of the possibility of repair that they have urged Congress to 
eliminate the doctrine entirely and replace it with some mix of increased 
applicant submission requirements and PTO investigative powers, 
enhanced post-issuance review proceedings, and deterrence through 
fines (in lieu of the unenforceability remedy) penalizing non-
compliance.235 
The issue here, however, is not the failings of existing inequitable 
conduct doctrine but whether misuse provides a better solution.236  
Abuse of the patenting process clearly is inconsistent with the patent 
 
232. Therasense v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 593 F.3d 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2010), rehearing 
en banc granted, 374 Fed.Appx. 35 (Fed.Cir.(Cal.) Apr 26, 2010); ABA Delegates to Weigh in 
on; Support Fixing Inequitable Conduct Defense, Pat., Trademark & Copyright Law Daily 
(BNA) (Aug. 6, 2009), reprinted in 8/6/2009 PTD d1 (Westlaw); ABA Section Urges Leahy, 
Specter to Limit, Not Eliminate Inequitable Conduct Defense, Pat. Trademark & Copyright 
Law Daily (BNA) (Feb. 24, 2009), reprinted in 2/24/2009 PTD d1 (Westlaw); IPO Annual 
Meeting Panel Debate: Inequitable Conduct Doctrine Worth Saving?, Pat., Trademark & 
Copyright Law Daily (BNA) (Oct. 6, 2008), reprinted in 10/6/2008 PTD d3 (Westlaw). 
233. See id. 
234. See Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 177, 179–80 (Harlan, J., concurring) (pointing out 
the need to distinguish between cases of “deliberate fraud” and patents voidable “under one 
or more of the numerous technicalities attending the issuance of a patent” to avoid adverse 
effects on patent law’s encouragement of innovation). 
235. See supra note 232. 
236. Requirements limiting the application of antitrust and other general laws mean 
they will not reach or sanction much problematic applicant behavior during prosecution.  For 
example, the heightened “fraud” standard for Walker Process antitrust liability, discussed 
infra note 236, likely does not reach less egregious actions that may, nonetheless, increase 
costs or errors in prosecution.  Similarly, the substantial constraints on finding common law 
fraud prevent its use to reach much applicant behavior which impedes reaching proper 
prosecution outcomes.  Cf., J.P. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1559 (“Conduct before the PTO that may 
render a patent unenforceable is broader than common law fraud.”).  
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regime’s goal of promoting innovation, the asserted primary justification 
for misuse.237  Additionally, obtaining an unmerited patent meets the 
doctrinal requirement of exceeding the scope of the invention, as mere 
acquisition produces unwarranted rights.238 
The difficulty lies (again) in the doctrine’s lack of nuance.  
Appropriately addressing improper applicant prosecution behavior 
requires more than identifying an improper outcome.  It also must 
consider the same cost-benefit239 and deterrence issues240 causing the 
present difficulties in inequitable conduct.  An independent misuse 
doctrine adds nothing to that discussion.  At best, it would incorporate 
the ultimate inequitable conduct outcomes, adding only duplication and 
another set of costs.  At worst, it would introduce the confusion of 
conflicting requirements, generating additional rounds of expensive and 
time consuming attempts to reconcile the two approaches seeking to 
accomplish the same end.241 
ii.  Inappropriate enforcement of patents  
A patent permits the owner to threaten and seek judicial 
enforcement for alleged infringement.  Although enforcement is by its 
nature disruptive, time-consuming and expensive, the costs cannot be 
entirely avoided.  They represent the logical consequences of 
 
237. See supra notes 170, 198 and accompanying text. 
238. See Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 343 (1971); supra 
notes 54–72 and accompanying text (discussing the patent policy “limitation to the invention” 
on which misuse is based). 
239. See supra notes 232–34 and accompanying text. 
240. Misuse applied to behavior that results in an invalid patent claim, at most, only 
adds the deterrent downside of rendering all the patent’s claims unenforceable.  When the 
patent is entirely invalid there is no downside at all, making the attempt to mislead “worth 
the risk”.  Inequitable conduct’s unenforceability remedy suffers from the same short-coming, 
leading advocates for its reform to argue for financial penalties instead.  See supra note 235.  
Adding the ability to affirmatively assert the improper conduct and claim damages rather 
than merely raise it as a defense to infringement, a serious flaw in misuse as well, would also 
go far toward resolving the issue.  See infra notes 242–52 (discussing the “Walker Process” 
antitrust claims predicated on improper prosecution behavior). 
241. Protecting the patent regime’s ability to implement its innovation goals certainly 
justifies some form of legal intervention.  Cf. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. 
Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815–20 (1945) (making the point and citing to Morton 
Salt, but not specifically applying the patent misuse doctrine).  See also Walker Process 
Equip. Inc. v. Food Mach. and Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175–78 (1965) (citing to Precision 
Instrument).  As noted above, although a logical argument can be made that the inequitable 
conduct issue is a form of patent misuse, that semantic argument misses the point of the 
justification inquiry.  See supra note 226.  The question is whether the existing misuse doctrine 
provides a uniquely useful mechanism for resolving the concern.  As in this case it does not, it 
makes more sense to leave the courts and Congress to refine the inequitable conduct doctrine 
in light of that experience rather than compound the problem with parallel and duplicative 
misuse modifications simply to preserve the doctrine’s name. 
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implementing the patent regime’s incentive through a legal right to 
exclude.  Such costs are, however, much more problematic when 
enforcement activities involve an invalid patent or target a non-
infringer.  As such situations do not advance the incentive goals of the 
regime, in a perfect world they should never arise.  In the real world, 
uncertainty and legitimate error must be given their due.  To hold 
patent owners strictly accountable for every improper assertion would 
substantially reduce the value of patents, seriously undermining the 
regime’s ability to provide the desired incentives.242 
Non-misuse (general) law seeks to reconcile these competing 
interests through the tort of abuse of process243 and antitrust law’s 
“sham” litigation and Walker Process doctrines.244  These laws seek an 
appropriate balance by expressly requiring proof of the patent owner’s 
bad faith.  The first two laws sanction claims made without probable 
cause (without a reasonable, objective basis for believing the patent 
valid) and for an ulterior motive (a purpose other than obtaining 
substantive adjudication of the claim).245  The last requires intentional 
fraud during patent prosecution.246  Because these requirements 
 
242. See, e.g., Walker Process, 382 U.S. at 179–80; USM Corp. v. SPS Tech., Inc., 694 
F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) (both discussing the adverse effects of over-sanctioning patent 
owners on the patent regime).  In addition seeking judicial assistance in enforcement is a 
form of government petition and raises First Amendment concerns.  See E.R.R. Presidents 
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 137–38 (1961); infra note 250 (discussing 
related possible limitation on misuse). 
243. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 674–75 (1977). 
244. See Calkins, supra note 12, at 200–20; Janis, supra note 87, at 268–77; MERGES & 
DUFFY, supra note 229, ch. 12.D.  The precise relationship between Walker Process claims 
and “sham” litigation is unclear.  The Federal Circuit distinguishes between the former’s 
foundational antecedent “fraud” on the patent office and the latter’s focus on abuse of the 
litigation process.  See, e.g., Dippin’ Dots Inc. v. Mosely, 476 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2007), cert. 
denied, 552 U.S. 948 (2007); Nobelpharma AB v. Implant Innovations, 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998); Janis, supra note 85, at 276–77; Merges & Duffy, supra note 229, at 1277–79. 
245. See Prof’l Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 62–63 
(1993).  The Court has emphasized that antitrust liability requires both objectively baseless 
and subjectively motivated by anticompetitive purpose, but discussed the former requirement 
by reference to the tort abuse of process.  See id. at 60–63.  To the extent they are equivalent, 
abuse of process and sham litigation provide alternative bases for challenging the same 
action, assertion of an objectively baseless claim for ulterior motives.  However, antitrust 
sanctions will only apply if the action harms competition, not merely a competitor.  See id. at 
60–61.  See also Nobelpharma, 141 F.3d 1059; MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 219, at 1278–79 
(discussing the narrowing of the antitrust “sham” litigation doctrine by the Court in 
Professional Real Estate Investors).  Additionally, antitrust recovery also requires satisfying 
all the elements of an antitrust violation, including demonstrating a net harm has occurred. 
246. Because a Walker Process claim exposes the patent owner to antitrust remedies 
(including treble damages), its fraud requirement is substantially higher than under 
inequitable conduct or common law fraud.  See Janis, supra note 87, at 268–75 (discussing the 
evolution of the standard); MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 229, at 1278. 
2011] LIVING WITH PATENTS 57 
 
significantly reduce the likelihood of liability for asserting invalid rights 
or making claims against non-infringers, society unquestionably bears 
some excess costs.  The question is whether the misuse defense better 
addresses the problem. 
Improper assertion cases bear a strong conceptual connection to 
misuse’s focus on preventing patent over-reaching.247  They clearly 
involve actions beyond the scope of the patent right producing 
unmerited social costs.  The difficulty, again, lies in the particulars of 
application.  Under existing doctrine, the misuse defense would be 
triggered by finding that the assertion went beyond the physical or 
temporal scope of the patent.248  That technically occurs in every case 
lost by the patent owner, including those based on non-infringement.  
Imposing liability on that basis would make patent assertion a perilous 
proposition.  The vagaries of litigation coupled with the risk of losing 
even an otherwise valid patent would heavily bias any rational owner 
toward limiting claims having a substantially certain positive outcome.  
That would significantly reduce the value of patents, making the regime 
much less effective in accomplishing its incentive function.249 
Adding appropriate “wiggle room” is precisely what drives the abuse 
of process, “sham” litigation, and Walker Process requirements.  
Although these doctrines may provide imperfect solutions, as with the 
earlier antitrust and inequitable conduct inquiries, the failure of existing 
law to fully deliver on its assigned goal does not justify misuse.  Misuse 
must provide a better solution. 
Achieving a proper balance through misuse would require a 
complete overhaul of the doctrine.  To avoid over-sanction, its “scope of 
the patent” inquiry would need to be jettisoned in favor of an inquiry 
permitting reasonable error (likely involving the objective merits and 
subjective motivations) and acknowledging First Amendment 
limitations.250  To provide proper relief and deterrence, the blanket 
unenforceability remedy would be replaced by relief offering the nuance 
of the tort and antitrust law approaches–injunctions and damages 
 
247. Cf. In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig., 203 F.3d 1322, 1327–28 (2000) 
(indicating, perhaps, room may exist for a misuse claim even absent fraud on the patent office 
or sham litigation, but ultimately being circumspect regarding the appropriate bases for such 
a claim). 
248. See supra notes 237–38 and accompanying text (making the same point with 
regard to inequitable conduct). 
249. See In re Indep. Serv. Org., 203 F.3d at 1327–28 (“misuse law and precedent need 
not be enlarged into an open-ended pitfall for patent supported commerce”). 
250. See id. (The conduct to which the jury instruction on misuse generally refers —
”wrongful” enforcement of patents, is actively protected under Noerr and California Motor, 
and is not subject to collateral attack as a new ground of “misuse.”). 
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addressing the actual harms caused and exemplary damages deterring 
unjustified assertions in the first instance.251 
Making such dramatic changes to misuse would entail an 
unnecessary and expensive process merely to address the general law 
concerns and adopt similar solutions.252  Moreover, even if the necessary 
adjustments were made, avoiding confusion and waste would lead to 
eliminating one of the regimes, making the misuse exercise a 
meaningless duplicative exercise.  The better solution lies in making the 
changes directly to the existing general law regimes. 
PART III: WHAT NEXT? 
A. Eliminating Misuse 
Misuse cannot be justified under the existing market efficiency 
paradigm.253  The doctrine should be eliminated.  Although the Federal 
Circuit’s anticompetitive effects requirement254 mitigates the concern, 
two arguments strongly support more definitive action.  First, as long as 
the doctrine exists it will be asserted.  That will trigger unhelpful and 
expensive debates over the doctrine’s appropriate reach and, most 
particularly, if, how, and when the anticompetitive effects requirement 
should be applied.255  As no reason exists for preserving misuse at all, no 
time or resources should be wasted on discussing its proper application.  
Second, even should that process ultimately successfully cabin most 
misuse applications to antitrust principles, the Federal Circuit cannot 
eliminate the continuing damage done by the Supreme Court’s per se 
misuse precedents.256  Full resolution requires direct and immediate 
 
251. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (discussing the shortcomings of the 
patent misuse unenforceability remedy compared to antitrust law’s more flexible approach). 
252. As with inequitable conduct, existence of the specialized legal doctrines governing 
inappropriate patent assertion support some supplemental legal constraint beyond that 
provided by other “general law” (including fraud and antitrust).  Although these doctrines 
might be viewed as addressing forms of “patent misuse,” they differ significantly from current 
misuse doctrine, procedurally, substantively and remedially.  The relevant question is 
whether misuse adds something which justifies its independent existence.  See supra notes 226 
(discussing the error in treating these other doctrines as forms of “misuse”), 236–41 and 
accompanying text (discussing the same “changes” point in connection with inequitable 
conduct). 
253. The above analysis confirms Judge Posner’s wry but insightful observation that in 
the current economic efficiency paradigm “our law is not rich in alternative concepts to 
monopolistic abuse.”  USM Corp. v. SPS Tech., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982). 
254. See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying text. 
255. See supra notes 118–21 and accompanying text (discussing the unhelpful “scope of 
the patent” distraction and the problems it raised in Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 
F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). 
256. See supra note 87.  
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intervention. 
Theoretically, congressional action provides the cleanest solution.  
That body clearly has the authority under its Constitutional mandate to 
set patent policy257 and could definitively resolve the issue by 
legislatively overruling the judicial doctrine.  Moreover, adding misuse 
to the ongoing patent reform discussion would provide useful assistance 
in understanding other issues on the agenda, such as helping distinguish 
between internal calibration and exploitation implementation 
shortcomings, as well as identifying underlying normative 
disagreements.258  Despite these benefits, the present polarized political 
environment makes it unlikely the legislature can engage in coherent, 
much less productive, expanded patent policy debate.259 
Fortunately, an alternative exists.  The Supreme Court created 
misuse and has the ability to bring down the curtain on its now overly 
long run.  The Federal Circuit’s anticompetitive effects approach 
generates a myriad of appeals, offering ready opportunity for Supreme 
Court review.260  The emergence of modern antitrust law provides the 
necessary jurisprudential justification for reversing the long-standing 
misuse precedents.261 
The Court originally created the misuse doctrine to deal with use of 
patent power262 in the absence of other effective legal constraints.263  As 
 
257. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 229, at 7; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also 
supra notes 39–43 and accompanying text (discussing the origins of United States patent law). 
258. See infra Part III.B. 
259. The reality of how hard it is to obtain political consensus even in “good” times 
was evident in the early effort to tie misuse to antitrust law.  See supra note 101 (discussing 
the issue in connection with the 1988 amendments to § 271(d)). 
260. Ironically, the better job the Federal Circuit does of cabining the doctrine, the less 
likely those most directly affected (patent holders) are to appeal.  The best avenue to the 
Court may therefore lie in questioning the Federal Circuit’s proper application of antitrust 
principles, giving the Court the opportunity to dispense with the unnecessary intermediary 
misuse doctrine as well as to clean up antitrust law in the innovation context.  See supra notes 
164–65 (discussing the disagreement between the Federal Circuit majority and dissent over 
the proper application of antitrust law in Princo); supra notes 208–13 (discussing the concern 
more generally). 
261. The doctrine of stare decisis demands more than the Justices’ belief that the prior 
decisions are incorrect.  It requires a clear rationale for abandoning the precedent.  Of direct 
relevance to misuse, the Court has recently revisited a number of long standing antitrust 
precedents and determined that the evolution of antitrust analysis has sufficiently 
undermined their original foundations to justify overruling them.  See, e.g., Leegin Creative 
Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887–88, 899–907 (2007) (albeit over a very 
vigorous dissent); State Oil, Inc. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–22 (1997).  As discussed in the text, 
that evolution applies with equal force to the continued usefulness of misuse. 
262. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 519 
(1917) (“A restriction which would give to the [patent owner] such a potential power of evil 
over an industry . . . .”); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942) 
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the Court recently noted in Illinois Tool Works,264 modern antitrust law 
now provides a better understanding of patent power and its effects 
than the presumptions reflected in misuse precedent.  The mere 
possession of a patent does not create sufficient market power to disrupt 
the invisible hand; in fact, in most cases, it does not.265  Nor does every 
patent related transaction produce an undesirable outcome;266 in fact, 
most do not.  The Rule of Reason provides a superior legal tool for 
making those important distinctions and antitrust remedies permit 
better calibrated responses to any resulting harms.  Together they 
render the much blunter misuse scope of the patent/blanket 
unenforceability approach obsolete. 
Nor does past Congressional action267 prevent Court action.  That 
institution’s statutory misuse interventions should be interpreted in the 
light of the legislative-judicial relationship regarding the management of 
anticompetitive market activity.  The Sherman Act left creation and 
evolution of appropriate responses to the courts; a task they equally 
clearly accepted.268  The legislative limitations on misuse269  no more 
 
(“respondent is making use of its patent monopoly to restrain competition” and “the use of [a 
patent monopoly] to suppress competition”); Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29, 32–33 (1964) 
(“using the licenses to project its monopoly beyond the patent period,” “to exact the same 
terms and conditions,” “subject to [the patent’s] leverage,” and “negotiate with the leverage 
of that monopoly”); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 137–140 
(1969) (“may not use the power of his patent,” “used its patent leverage to coerce a promise,” 
“use the power of his patent to insist,” and “using that monopoly to coerce agreement”); 
Carbice Corp. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 34 (1931) (The Court found 
“analogous to the use of a patent as an instrument for restraining commerce which was 
condemned under the Sherman Anti-trust Law . . . .”).  The Federal Circuit majority in 
Princo clearly saw the connection, but lacked the authority to fully implement its 
ramifications.  See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
263. Misuse arose before “there was any significant body of federal antitrust law, and 
reached maturity long before that law . . . attained its present broad scope.”  See USM Corp. 
v. SPS Tech., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 1982).  The Court’s last substantive misuse case 
was decided in 1969, well before the Rule of Reason net efficiency calculus which emerged in 
the late 1970s.  See HOVENKAMP, supra note 25, § 2.2b–2.2e (discussing the emergence of the 
“Chicago school” and its effect on antitrust policy during the 1970s and 1980s).  Most 
importantly, that opinion reflected the emerging net outcome antitrust approach in its 
dismissal of the per se approach based on the patents physical and temporal scope in favor of 
“balancing.”  See supra notes 16, 166–70 and accompanying text (discussing Zenith Radio).   
264. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); see also Cnty. Materials 
Corp. v. Allan Block Corp., 502 F.3d 730, 735–36 (7th Cir. 2008). 
265. Ill. Tool Works, 547 U.S. at 45–46. 
266.  Id. at 44–45 (“Many tying arrangements, even those involving patents and 
requirements ties, are fully consistent with a free, competitive market.”). 
267. See supra notes 90–102 and accompanying text (describing the two Congressional 
actions involving patent misuse). 
268. See State Oil, Inc. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–21 (1977); AREEDA ET AL., supra note 
25, at 35–38; Sullivan, supra note 36, at 8. 
269. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text. 
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signaled Congress’s intention to freeze misuse in its then-current state 
than passage of the Clayton Act mandated termination of judicial 
changes in antitrust doctrine.  Rather, Section 271(d) reflects a 
legislative desire to prevent over-expansion of the judicial doctrine, 
otherwise leaving the status quo of court management intact.270  
Moreover, interpreting misuse intervention more expansively would 
incongruously leave the courts far-ranging freedom to adjust “statutory” 
antitrust law (which it does, frequently making significant doctrinal 
changes)271 but without authority to adjust its own misuse doctrine as 
necessary to produce compatible results. 
Nor would judicial elimination of misuse render Congressional 
action meaningless.  The relevant statutory sections operate entirely in 
the negative.  They contain nothing mandating misuse; they merely 
prevent its application in particular situations.272  Those restrictions 
would simply be subsumed into a more general judicial determination 
that the doctrine no longer serves any valid purpose as a whole.273 
Finally, private reliance interests are of little, if any, concern.274  
Eliminating misuse would leave licensing term assessment to antitrust 
and other general laws’ already independently applicable requirements.  
As a result, no existing transactions would require adjustment.  
Increased flexibility may disadvantage some earlier prospective 
licensees.  Misuse prohibitions may have forced them to pursue 
alternatives, producing sunk costs and existing agreements impairing 
their transition to the patented solution.  Those problems, however, 
stem from misuse’s elimination of alternatives, not an assumption that 
misuse would continue to protect their interests.  In all events, to the 
extent such individual harms occur, they will be temporary in nature, 
hardly meriting forcing society to bear the misuse doctrine’s much 
greater inefficiencies. 
The Court should take immediate action, granting certiorari at the 
first opportunity.275  Merely adopting the Federal Circuit’s competitive 
effects approach as the general misuse test would needlessly leave the 
doctrine in place, leading to superfluous claims and pointless debates 
 
270. See supra notes 92–102 and accompanying text. 
271. See supra note 261; Cont’l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 52, n. 19 (1977) 
(overruling U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967)). 
272. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text; Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
273. Cf. Leegin Creative Leather Prod., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 905–07 (2007). 
274. Id. at 906–07. 
275. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2010); See supra 
note 260 (discussing the possibility of an appeal based on the Princo application of antitrust 
law). 
62  MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:1 
 
over its proper application.  The Court should instead explicitly overrule 
its earlier decisions creating the doctrine and affirmatively place the 
related patent concerns exclusively within the province of “general law,” 
including antitrust, inequitable conduct, abuse of process and antitrust 
sham and Walker Process claims. 
B. Living with Patents: Getting What We Want from Patent Law   
Taking misuse out of the equation does not ensure proper patent 
outcomes.  Patent law’s significant internal difficulties have produced 
spirited reform debate over issues ranging over the entire possible 
range, from subject matter through remedies.276  The primary misuse 
replacement, antitrust law, similarly raises serious concerns.277  Rule of 
Reason assessment is uncertain, time-consuming and expensive.  
Existing doctrinal standards severely constrain application to minimize 
false positives, making it a questionable tool for dealing with 
problematic issues such as pharmaceutical reverse-payments278 and 
standards capture.279 
The reason misuse comes so readily to mind as a solution and the 
logic for nonetheless abandoning it tell us much about how best to 
approach these important concerns.  Labeling a patent problem 
“misuse” because it “exceeds the scope of the patent” is an apparently 
logical recognition of a patent’s inherent limitations.  Taking away an 
offending owner’s patent provides an emotionally satisfying response.  
However, the doctrine most frequently produces either an over, or 
under response, providing no useful assistance in addressing, much less 
resolving, the problems we actually face when it comes to living with 
patents. 
Finding appropriate solutions requires acknowledging that the 
regime by its nature makes some pain inevitable.  As a result, when 
responding to complaints we must distinguish between those complaints 
meriting action and those which do not.  That, in turn, means we should 
only respond to pain arising from adverse effects not essential to 
accomplishing the goals we have set for the regime.  Thus redefined, 
legitimate “misuse” concerns only arise from two sources: (1) improper 
 
276. See, e.g., Senate Judiciary Committee’s Amendment Seeks to Restart Patent Reform 
Discussion and Patent Community Mostly Supports Senate’s Substitute Amendment on Patent 
Reform, Pat., Trademark & Copyright Law Daily (BNA) (Mar. 9, 2010) reprinted in 3/9/2010 
PTD d1 (Westlaw); Patent Reform Compromise Won’t End Debate, LAW 360 
(March 5, 2010), http://www.law360.com/print_article/153905. 
277. See supra notes 157–67 and accompanying text. 
278. See supra note 2. 
279. See supra note 8. 
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doctrinal implementation generating harms unnecessary to produce the 
agreed goal, or (2) disagreement over the goal, making even harms 
necessary to produce the rejected objectives unacceptable. 
Beyond identifying the two sources of proper complaints that should 
frame our patent discussions, the “improper implementation-goals 
disagreement” formulation of misuse provides an additional important 
insight.  The two sources of patent difficulty involve very different 
concerns and require very different solutions.  Without agreement on 
what we want to achieve addressing how best to accomplish our goal 
makes little sense.  That makes it vital to avoid confusing and 
unproductive conflation of discussion over where we want to go with 
how to get there. 
1.  Complaints Involving Improper Implementation   
Many (and likely, most) current complaints about patents raise 
concerns, make arguments, and suggest solutions within the patent 
regime’s existing efficiency paradigm.280  These discussions should be 
treated exclusively as doctrinal implementation concerns with that goal 
providing the exclusive assessment metrics.  An appropriate outcome 
requires that internal patent law issuance requirements, rights, and 
remedies produce the optimal increase in innovation taking into account 
the access harms produced by a legal right to exclude others.  Similarly, 
proper general law constraint of patent exploitation, in particular by 
antitrust law, must prevent additional net reductions in efficiency caused 
by conditions on permitted access.  These two straight-forward 
guidelines control regardless of the effects on specific individuals.  If 
complaints persist, then non-efficiency concerns are in play.  That 
requires we first address the antecedent normative question of “what we 
want” before pursuing implementation.281 
The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated by its application 
to the hotly contested issues on the current patent reform agenda.282  
The highly contentious debate over patentable subject matter (including 
 
280. When proponents explicitly state their proposal implicates non-efficiency 
normative drivers, then implementation should give way to goal discussion.  See infra Part 
III.B.2. 
281. See infra Part III.B.2.  In many cases the value of the implementation-normative 
dichotomy will be to “smoke out” either disingenuous or latent desires for either enhanced 
individual returns or avoidance of individual distributional harms.  Once normative 
resolution has been reached, the problem again becomes assuring proper implementation, 
with the identified outcome providing the necessary metric for determining appropriate 
doctrinal outcomes as described for efficiency in the text. 
282. See supra note 276. 
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business methods,283 DNA and “natural law” medical diagnostic 
techniques)284 provides a good baseline example.  Advocates for 
patentability argue the patent incentive is essential to spurring adequate 
innovation in those fields.  Those wary of such patent’s adverse 
consequences, in particular competitors and end-users, argue the 
additional innovation produced (if any) does not justify the associated 
costs. 
The efficiency-implementation metric clarifies how these conflicting 
positions should be assessed: will such patents produce optimal 
increases in innovation, in light of the related inefficiencies?  A positive 
response means such patents should be granted,285 while answering in 
the negative means they should be withheld.  Granting the patents will 
undeniably cause harm to those feeling the exclusionary effects.  
Refusing such patents will equally certainly produce free-riding harms 
to those investing and, ultimately, to some reduction in such activity.  In 
either case, however, the harms reflect only the inherent cost of 
pursuing the efficiency goal. 
The above does not mean that the complaints of those suffering 
adverse effects have no merit, only that they raise concerns 
inappropriate to the implementation debate.  An efficient market does 
not ensure we each receive everything we desire.  Nor will it protect 
individuals from, sometimes substantial, harm.  However, these personal 
outcome concerns require a very different inquiry, one which explicitly 
assesses, rather than assumes, the desirability of an efficiency-based 
patent law.  Addressing them as implementation issues looks in the 
wrong place for resolution.  It makes no logical sense to discuss the how 
before we have determined what we want.286 
The efficiency-implementation metric similarly clarifies the myriad 
“bad patent” discussions, such as the appropriate level of pre-issuance 
examination,287 proper forms of post-issuance review, and the standards 
governing inequitable conduct.288  Within the efficiency paradigm, the 
only relevant metric is whether the rules optimally produce “good and 
 
283. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Chiappetta, Internet, supra note 39. 
284. See supra note 6. 
285. There are, of course, a variety of possible forms such patents might take.  The 
same metric applies to specific proposals as to the simplified “yes-no” question discussed in 
the text.  See Chiappetta, Internet, supra note 39, at 310 (discussing the range of options, 
including allowing patent protection but adjusting the related rights and remedies). 
286. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the nature of normative disagreement and how it 
affects the related debates). 
287. See, e.g., Tight Budget May Delay Kappos’ Plans For USPTO, LAW 360 (March 
10, 2010), http://www.law360.com/print_article/150390. 
288. See supra notes 232–35 and accompanying text. 
2011] LIVING WITH PATENTS 65 
 
timely” patents in light of the related efficiency costs.  Those suffering 
the consequences, whether of undeserved patents or increased costs of 
review, have merely been tapped to bear the unavoidable consequences 
of an efficiency driven system.  If that bad distributional karma proves 
unacceptable, the appropriate response is to argue for changing the 
regime’s goals, not for adjustments in its doctrine. 
The intense debate over injunctions and apportionment of damages 
is similarly simplified.289  Market efficiency dictates an injunction 
whenever specific enforcement produces optimal net incentives in light 
of the related costs.290  Damage apportionment proposals should be 
tested against that same standard, taking into account unavoidable error 
and costs of administration.  Patent owners disgruntled by reduced 
individual returns will complain of injustice.  Disfavored competitors 
and consumers will bemoan hold-out compensation extorted by 
“unproductive trolls”291 and the disconnection between damage awards 
and the patent’s actual contribution.292  But when, in aggregate, patent 
remedies cause no more harm than that necessary to produce the 
regime’s targeted outcome of maximally efficient market operation 
under the real world circumstances, such complaints challenge the 
desirability of its goal, not its implementation. 
Although when an owner grants access to a patent, the concern 
moves beyond internal patent law calibration to general law governance 
of terms of access,293 the implementation metric remains the same.  
Patent owners’ actions must be assessed for additional unmerited costs.  
Within the current efficiency maximizing paradigm, proper 
implementation depends exclusively on whether general law (including 
antitrust) appropriately identifies and sanctions activities that on net 
 
289. See supra note 9. 
290. The focus in eBay on using traditional equitable factors in its multi-opinion eBay 
decision only vaguely helps apply the efficiency metric.  See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, 
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).  Justice Kennedy’s concurrence provides more guidance, in 
particular, by looking to the sufficiency of monetary damages under the circumstances (which 
the lower courts seem to have pursued in the emerging “competitor” inquiry).  See supra note 
9. 
291. Viewed through the lens of patent policy, a patent troll does not act 
inappropriately by refusing access until payment is made.  Society has assigned them control 
over their patent bridge explicitly to exact the toll for crossing as an incentive to innovate for 
the common good.  If the implementation of the right to exclude produces a net harm, that is 
a short-coming in patent law, not the patent owner’s actions, and should be adjusted by 
changing the law not punishing the owner.  See supra note 290 (discussing one such 
adjustment, the change in availability of injunctions). 
292. See supra note 9. 
293. As discussed in Part II.B, any action beyond a mere refusal to grant access should 
be subjected to general law review.  See supra notes 118–21 and accompanying text 
(discussing the point in the context of the misuse “scope of the patent” inquiry). 
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decrease efficient market performance.  When properly calibrated, 
general law will still permit social costs and a variety of individual 
harms, but they will only be those required to produce the targeted 
system goal.  Complaints over those negative effects may have 
normative merit, but they have no role in an efficiency-driven 
implementation discussion. 
The industry standard’s ambush294 and reverse payments “misuse” 
concerns295 illustrate the point.  Within the market efficiency paradigm, 
the only relevant question is whether these actions produce net 
efficiency losses.  If so, and they are not captured by applicable general 
law, then an implementation adjustment should be made.  But those 
changes should only go as far as necessary to produce the targeted net 
efficient outcome.  Any remaining concerns, for example with the 
“ethical” propriety of an “ambusher’s” behavior, or the distributional 
consequences of suppressing lower cost generics, are irrelevant to the 
discussion.  They may have merit, but they belong in a separate debate 
which explicitly considers the desirability of moving away from market 
efficiency to incorporate other considerations. 
Segregating the implementation inquiry from debate over goals and 
focusing on the net efficiency metric does not make implementation 
easy in practice.296  The related factual determinations trigger 
contentious debates over relevant benefits and costs, require expensive 
and time-consuming data collection and necessitate complex 
interpretation, quantification, and doctrinal decisions.  However, 
interjecting other metrics reflecting other goals only exacerbates the 
situation, particularly when proponents articulate their concerns in 
market paradigm terms and frame their solutions as doctrinal 
adjustments.  Developing a patent system that produces what we want 
requires that we first agree upon the goal.  Combining the two activities 
will only produce a very poorly constructed and expensive road to 
nowhere, if it produces anything useful at all. 
2.  Complaints Involving Goal Disagreements  
Many “misuse” issues and reform proposals (including some 
purporting to improve market operation) seek outcomes in conflict with 
the current efficiency paradigm.297  A common objective involves 
 
294. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
295. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
296. See Chiappetta, Internet, supra note 39, at 310–11. 
297. The innovation policy concerns of misuse proponents provide a useful example 
beyond those discussed in the text.  The innovation primacy argument goes beyond whether 
existing legal doctrine fails to produce optimally net efficient outcomes to advocacy of 
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changing the distributional consequences.  Reflecting only real supply 
and demand, an efficient market will deny some (even many) what they 
believe to be their “due,” others their “needs” and yet others any 
allocation at all.  The “losers” (and others sympathetic to their 
situation) find that outcome unacceptable and demand adjustments, not 
because the market is operating inefficiently, but based on notions of 
what constitutes a “fair” and “just” society.  Similarly, the standard 
“ambush” and patent “troll” rhetoric can reasonably be interpreted as 
raising concerns over the “ethics” of the challenged behavior.298  But 
attaching moral approbation to such patent owners’ activities requires a 
significant change from the current efficiency drivers.  In that paradigm, 
aggressive pursuit of self-interest is affirmatively promoted, subject only 
to the constraints of a properly operating competitive marketplace.299 
The distinction between implementation shortcomings and goal 
disagreement debates provides the way forward.  First, it ensures we do 
not conflate these two very different kinds of patent problems.300  
Addressing undesirable consequences of an efficient market by ensuring 
existing laws produce maximum efficiency will only serendipitously even 
address, much less resolve, these complaints.301  Similarly, arguing for 
rules implementing distributional or behavioral goals without 
addressing the resulting inefficiencies will gain no traction with those 
firmly in the market economy camp.  At best, doctrine-based arguments 
seeking to resolve normative disagreement cause us to talk past each 
other and, more frequently, polarize and poison debate.302 
Second, it clarifies that unlike implementation, no ready metric 
 
protecting innovation in its own right.  See supra notes 200–03 and accompanying text.  
Although there is nothing normative inappropriate with the latter view, it will not be 
produced by laws designed to ensure an efficient market.  If it is to be pursued as social 
policy, it should be raised explicitly and the related decision made prior to embarking on 
implementation. 
298. See supra notes 8–9, discussing the complaints. 
299. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
300. Cf. generally Chiappetta, International, supra note 24 (discussing the issue in 
connection with resolving conflicting normative approaches to intellectual property law). 
301. Frequently, of course, such debates will involve questions of degree.  For example, 
a substantial majority of the United States citizenry may agree that the efficient market 
approach produces the best possible basic means for allocating resources in a constrained real 
world (particularly given experience with the alternatives).  Disagreement arises because 
some significant minority believes that a “just” society will also ensure some threshold level 
of access to particular resources (for example, food, shelter and health care).  Whether in 
whole or in part, these disagreements cannot be resolved by looking at the problem 
exclusively through the lens of market efficiency. 
302. See Vincent Chiappetta, The (Practical) Meaning of Property, 46 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 297, 335–55 (2009) [hereinafter Chiappetta, Property] (discussing the problematic 
nature of normative debate in the context of property law). 
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exists to resolve our normative differences.303  Economic efficiency can 
claim no precedence based merely on its consistency with the status quo.  
That is the precise source of the opponents’ complaint (citing to existing 
law as somehow definitive constitutes a particularly egregious failure in 
this regard).  Normative disagreement puts all positions back on the 
table.  But neither can the opponents argue the self-evident “justice” or 
“morality” of their distributional or behavioral objectives.  After the 
facts, positions, and their consequences have been articulated, advocacy 
for any particular outcome (whether efficiency, distributional or 
behavioral) constitutes no more (nor less) than an expression of 
personal preference. 
The practical solution lies (perhaps) in acknowledging our 
differences and seeking compromise.  Shifting debate from an effort to 
show others the error of their ways to finding workable outcomes 
requires reviewing all potential options for mutually acceptable 
concessions.  For example, the debate over reverse pharmaceutical 
payments triggers conflict among those who view patents as a matter of 
labor-based natural rights, those seeking to promote net “efficient” 
settlements in a market economy and those believing healthcare 
constitutes a fundamental personal right.  The range of options is 
equally extensive.  They range from complete freedom to make 
whatever payments the patent owner feels reasonable (giving labor its 
due, trumping all other positions) at one end to outright bans 
(healthcare access as an individual natural right) at the other.  In 
between lie the myriad more nuanced compromises such as a 
presumption of invalidity (patent owners must prove the payment 
reflects something other than collusion with a prospective competitor–
an economic efficiency focus, but with a procedural thumb on the scales 
in favor of a right of access) and a presumption of validity (opponents 
must prove collusion–an economic efficiency preference with the 
procedural thumb now favoring labor natural rights).  The objective, 
however, is not identifying the normatively “correct” position, but to 
find an outcome that permits us to agree despite our conflicting views of 
the “right” answer. 
The same process applied to standards “ambush” behavioral norm 
concerns would shift debate from the relative efficiency merits of 
private ordering versus fraud/antitrust law intervention304 to 
consideration of the full range of alternatives.  Those would include 
 
303. See id. at 338–42. 
304. See supra note 8 (citing references discussing the standard setting issue in the 
efficiency context). 
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variations on the current patent/general law approach (such as shifting 
burdens of proof or a universal and unwaivable obligation of good faith 
and fair dealing), mandatory disclosure, and/or requiring reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory licensing terms be made available to all.  Again, the 
goal would be finding an outcome which best accommodates the varying 
competing views regarding what matters “most”—efficiency, behavior 
or, perhaps, something else. 
The pursuit of compromise does not guarantee success.  Some 
normative disagreements involve intractable differences.305  Those 
believing in the intrinsic “justice” of the competitive marketplace 
system may find other distributional outcomes or constraints on pursuit 
of individual self interest wholly unacceptable.  Those who feel “justice” 
requires threshold need-based allocations or believe baseline civility is 
essential to a “good” society will find other outcomes anathema.  And, 
even when some concessions can be made, they may not produce the 
necessary common ground for compromise. 
In these “hard” cases, resort will be made to the political tools such 
as legislative voting, which allow action in the face of unresolved 
normative conflict.306  In these circumstances, and particularly when 
demanding an “up or down” vote, we would do well to keep in mind 
that the winners do not prevail because the losers have seen the light.  
They prevail because they have the power to demand adoption and 
enforcement of their preferred outcome.  In such cases, one person’s 
“justice” remains another’s “misuse”.  The real world consequences of 
patent law’s right to exclude means such losers will not only find the 
outcome “unfair” but have that unfairness made all the more 
unpalatable by having to suffer the distributional and behavioral 
consequences (whatever they might be).  That potent combination can 
produce serious questioning of the desirability of the overall social 
enterprise—few deprived of necessary medical care or food by a patent 
are likely to find sufficient solace in the fact that “in aggregate” it 
produces the “greater good.”  Attention to these practical consequences 
may not ultimately produce solutions, but it should at least cause us to 
consider the desirability of resolutely standing on principle in patent 
policy debate. 
CONCLUSION 
Patent misuse was created by the Supreme Court almost a century 
ago to address growing concerns over the effects of unchecked patent 
 
305. See Chiappetta, Property, supra note 302, at 352–54. 
306. See id. at 354. 
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power on the marketplace.  That problem has now been more 
appropriately addressed by the nuanced inquiries under antitrust law, 
the inequitable conduct doctrine and abuse of process and antitrust 
sham and Walker Process claims.  These legal tools maximize flexibility 
in obtaining, enforcing, accessing, and using patented inventions while 
ensuring the overall system advances its (current) primary goal of 
maximizing efficient market operation.  Continued application of 
misuse wastes time and resources on the wholesale revision of an 
obsolete and affirmatively harmful doctrine to produce, at best, the 
same outcome.  The patent misuse doctrine should be eliminated. 
The misuse experience provides valuable insights regarding how we 
might live, if not comfortably and least appropriately, with our patent 
regime.  It clarifies that every patent right to exclude unavoidably 
produces pain which will trigger complaint.  The instinct to punish 
patent owners when their actions cause discomfort will only 
serendipitously produce the desired outcome.  Proper response requires 
identifying and responding appropriately to the varying sources of 
patent unhappiness.  If the problem arises from patent law’s improper 
implementation of the task we have set for the regime, we should 
recalibrate its internal rules governing grant, rights and remedies.  If it 
arises from inadequate general law supervision of patent use, we should 
tighten those regulations.  If the complaints reflect the inherent 
consequences of implementing patent law in accordance with existing 
goals, we must reassess what we desire, but with the understanding that, 
however fervently we may wish it, in patents (as with the rest of life) we 
cannot have it all. 
 
